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Our criminal justice system promises defendants a fair and just adjudication of
guilt, regardless of the character of the alleged offense. Yet, from mandatory arrest
to "no-drop" prosecution policies, the system's front-end response to domestic violence reflects the belief that it differs from other crimes in ways that permit or
require the adaptation of criminal justice response mechanisms. Although scholars
debate whether these differential responses are effective or normatively sound, the
scholarship leaves untouched the presumption that, once the adjudicatory phase is
underway, the system treats domestic violence offenses like any other crime.
This Article reveals that this presumption is false. It demonstrates that many jurisdictions have adopted specialized evidence rules that authorize admission of highly
persuasive evidence of guilt in domestic violence prosecutions that would be inadmissible in other criminal cases. These jurisdictions unmoor evidence rules from
their justificatory principles to accommodate the same iteration of domestic violence exceptionalism that underlies specialized front-end criminal justice policies.
The Article argues that even though such evidentiary manipulation may be effective
in securing convictions, enlisting different evidence rules in our war on domestic
violence is unfair to defendants charged with such offenses and undermines the
integrity of the criminal justice system. It also harms some of the people the system
seeks to protect by both reducing the efficacy of the criminal justice intervention
and discrediting those complainants who do not support prosecution.
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INTRODUCTION

This Court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants
might prefer different rules in a particular class of cases. 1
[W]e have treated evidence that illuminates the history of the relationship between an accused and a victim [in a domestic violence prosecution] differently . . . . We believe this different treatment is
appropriate in the context of the accused and the alleged victim of
domestic abuse. 2

Although many laud the criminal justice system for treating
domestic violence the same as all other crimes,3 in fact the strategies
used to police and prosecute domestic violence are quite different
from those used in response to other crimes. A report of domestic
violence triggers a series of unique responses, including mandatory
arrest and "no-drop" prosecution policies4 and specialized investigation practices that facilitate prosecution without the complainant's
support. The purported aim of these differential arrest, investigatory,
1

2
3
4

United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992).
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004).
See infra note 61.
See infra Part I.
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and charging practices is to increase the number of domestic violence
cases that enter the adjudicatory system where domestic violence will
be treated "like every other case." 5
It was unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court rejected
the suggestion that it adopt a "special, improvised" Confrontation
Clause for domestic violence prosecutions in Giles v. California. 6 The
majority specified that legislatures may "combat" domestic violence
through "many means," but "abridging the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants is not in the State's arsenal." 7 Invoking the rhetoric of battle, the Court confirmed that we are at "war" against
domestic violence, but clarified that there are specific rules of engagement in this war, and compromising defendants' constitutional rights
violates these rules.s
Yet, while Giles prohibits the relaxation of constitutional protections for those accused of domestic violence, the decision authorizesand seems to encourage-the relaxation of evidentiary standards in
such prosecutions. Responding to concerns about the obstacles the
ruling would erect in domestic violence prosecutions, the Court
emphasized that the decision's reach was rather limited, since it
applied "only" to those testimonial statements that implicate the
Confrontation Clause. 9 Nontestimonial statements, such as statements
to friends or neighbors about "abuse and intimidation" and statements to medical providers, would be excluded "if at all, only by
hearsay rules," and states remained "free to adopt" less stringent for5 See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 552, 611-12 {2007) ("Even when
procedural reforms like mandatory arrest policies treated domestic violence cases
differently, it was with the aim of moving the cases into the system where they could be
judged under the criminal law like every other case."). For a discussion of how mandatory
arrest and "no-drop" prosecution policies emerged to redress the historical reluctance of
police and prosecutors to pursue cases involving domestic violence, see LEIGH
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

107-13 (2012).
6 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2007). The issue presented in Giles, a domestic
homicide prosecution, was whether the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause required proof that the defendant acted with the intent to prevent
the witness from testifying. Id. at 355. What was surprising about Giles was the apparent
willingness of the three dissenting Justices to adapt the Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence to alleviate the practical difficulties in securing convictions in domestic
violence prosecutions. See id. at 376 {"The dissent closes by pointing out that a forfeiture
rule which ignores Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive
relationships-or at least particularly helpful in punishing their abusers."). For further
discussion, see infra Part II.C.
7 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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feiture standards for the admission of such hearsay. 10 Thus, even after
Giles, the adoption of targeted, specialized evidence rules aimed at
securing convictions remains firmly within the arsenal of weapons the
government may use to fight domestic violence.
Surprisingly, although domestic violence law and policy has generated abundant scholarly attention, the question of whether states do
or should enlist evidentiary doctrine to combat domestic violence
remains largely undertheorized. Scholars have offered competing normative arguments about the proper role of the criminal justice system
in responding to domestic violence 11 and the merits of policies that
encourage or mandate arrest and prosecution of domestic violence
offenses. 12 Some support a criminalization model, which prioritizes a
strong criminal justice response over other alternatives, and suggest
that the criminal law should expand further to address domestic violence.13 Others criticize this model and suggest that the response to
domestic violence should extend beyond the criminal justice arena, 14
or bypass it altogether. 1 5
And yet, while the literature provides diverse perspectives on the
back-end efficacy of the criminalization model and the propriety of
the front-end mandatorization of the government's response in service
of that solution, scholars have paid relatively little attention to what
10 Id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where nontestimonial
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law .... ").
11 See Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law's "One Size Fits All" Response
to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 323-26 (2013) (summarizing
competing views of criminalization).
12 Compare GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 118-24 (critiquing mandatory policies for
depriving complainants of autonomy and agency), with Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1857 (1996) (concluding that the "societal benefits gained" from mandatory policies
"far outweigh any short-term costs to women's autonomy and collective safety"). For an
overview of these competing perspectives, see ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184-88 (2000).
13 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering:
A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 962 (2004)
(calling for a "reconceptualization of the crime of domestic violence" that "accurately
reflects its true nature and harm").
14 See, e.g., GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 178-97 (describing a range of possible
responses to domestic violence "beyond the law" including restorative justice, increased
economic stability, engagement with abusive men, and community accountability); BETH
E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA'S PRISON
NATION 163 (2012) (critiquing the criminalization model for presenting a criminal justice
response in "isolation from other possible responses" instead of as "part of a menu of
options for women who are harmed by male violence" and offering alternative responses).
15 Linda G. Mills, for example, advocates for a restorative justice approach to domestic
violence. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OuR RESPONSE TO INTIMATE
ABUSE 134, 140 (2003).
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happens in "the middle," specifically whether and to what extent evidence rules are manipulated to support prosecutions of domestic violence offenses. They largely overlook the process of proof and instead
focus on how the state should respond to domestic violence. 16
The few scholars who have considered evidentiary doctrine in
domestic violence prosecutions have universally criticized the application of traditional, transsubstantive evidence rules and standards in
domestic violence prosecutions and advocated for the adoption of specialized evidence rules that reflect the realities of domestic violence. 17
Emanating from a theoretical perspective that supports the criminalization model, these analyses identify targeted and more permissive
evidence rules as appropriate, and underutilized, weapons in the war
against domestic violence. 18
This Article challenges aspects of this conventional wisdom. It
argues not only that courts and legislatures already manipulate rules
of evidence in domestic violence prosecutions, but also that in so
doing they undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system and
the efficacy of criminal justice intervention. This Article offers a perspective largely overlooked in existing literature: critical attention to
the evidentiary standards used to prosecute male defendants accused
of domestic violence. 19 Taking a broad view of the national eviden16 The notable exception to this oversight of trial rules and procedures is the abundant
attention to the Confrontation Clause in domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford v.
Washington. E.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747,
749-55 (2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's
Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311-15
(2005).
17 See, e.g., Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's Complicity in Intimate Violence
Against Women, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 773, 819 (1997) (arguing that prosecutors "are
genuinely burdened with evidentiary rules that do not reflect the realities of domestic
violence" and proposing "broadening the evidentiary standard of relevancy in domestic
violence cases"); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence
and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 366 (1996)
(proposing to "bridge the gap between following the rules of evidence and serving justice
for victims of domestic violence" through the adoption of a "specialized evidentiary rule
for the admissibility of uncharged offenses of domestic violence in domestic violence
prosecutions"); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence:
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL L. REv. 1463, 1516 (1996) (proposing a "[d]omestic
[v]iolence [h]earsay exception"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 990 (critiquing evidence
rules for "mut[ing] stories of battering").
18 See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 17, at 1485 (identifying "appropriate evidentiary rules"
as one of the changes that will "diminish the untold suffering of women and the silent
victims-their children"); Comment, The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior
Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 221, 223 (1998) (advocating the
adoption of a "special rule allowing evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence cases" as
an essential step toward "ending the continuing cycle of domestic violence").
l9 By contrast, many have analyzed the development of new evidentiary concepts and
theories of relevancy to defend women accused of killing their abusive male partners. See,
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tiary landscape, it identifies evidence rules and standards that have
been unmoored from their justificatory principles in order to reflect
prevailing presumptions about domestic violence and the harms that
result from such consequentialist manipulation. 20 Drawing on antiessentialist feminist insights, it demonstrates how the manipulation of
evidence rules works to the detriment of some complainants21 by
overriding the explanations and experiences of those whose lived realities do not fit within the prevailing narrative of domestic violence or
do not support the presumption that state-imposed separation is the
only solution to domestic violence. 22
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I recounts the development of "domestic violence exceptionalism," 23 or the idea that
domestic violence is different from other crimes in ways that warrant
e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 112 ("Legal reform for battered women who kill has
been one of the most significant areas of feminist lawmaking on domestic violence.");
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1991) (providing an overview of
proposed reforms for evidentiary laws in prosecutions of women who killed their abusive
partners). Although the vast majority of criminal cases are now resolved by plea bargain,
such bargaining occurs, to some extent, "in the shadow" of the expected trial outcome. See
generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (developing "shadow of the law"
bargaining theory). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2467 (2004) ("[M]any plea bargains diverge from the shadows of
trials."). Rules that increase the evidence available to the prosecution can influence both
the prosecutor's offer and the likelihood the defendant will accept the plea.
20 This Article identifies trends in evidentiary rules and rulings across state
jurisdictions. It does not purport to offer a detailed fifty-state survey of evidence rules in
domestic violence prosecutions.
21 Choosing terms to describe the parties involved in domestic violence prosecutions is
an obstacle everyone who writes on the subject must confront, and there are many
different approaches. See, e.g., GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 199 n.1 (explaining why she
uses "woman subjected to abuse"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 960 n.3 (opting to use
the terms "battered woman" and "victim" to "emphasize the basic proposition that women
are indeed harmed by battering"). Since this analysis focuses on the prosecution of
domestic violence offenses, and since most of the case law involves allegations of abuse
against women by male intimate partners, I generally will use female pronouns and
"complainant" to identify the person who the state believes has been subjected to domestic
violence and male pronouns and "defendant" to identify the person accused of such
violence, underscoring the fact that guilt has not yet been established. Of course, domestic
violence is not limited to heterosexual relationships, and is not committed only by men
against women.
22 Thus, this analysis rejects the neoliberal presumptions that victims and offenders are
engaged in a "zero-sum policy game ... wherein the offender's gain is the victim's loss, and
being 'for' victims automatically means being tough on offenders" and "[a]ny untoward
attention to the rights or welfare of the offender ... detract[s] from the appropriate
measure of respect for victims." DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11 (2002).
23 I thank Leigh Goodmark for suggesting the term "domestic violence exceptionalism"
to describe this phenomenon.
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specialized criminal justice responses, and its influence in the develop-.
ment of unique arrest and prosecution policies for domestic violence
crimes. Part II documents the largely overlooked extension of
domestic violence exceptionalism into the very standards used to adjudicate guilt through an analysis of trends in the interpretation and
application of the character evidence rule, the medical treatment and
diagnosis hearsay exception, and the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in domestic violence assault prosecutions. Part III demonstrates
that this specialization of evidentiary doctrine assists the state in
securing convictions in domestic violence prosecutions by enabling
admission of otherwise inadmissible-but highly persuasive-evidence of guilt.
In Part IV, the Article identifies harms that result from manipulating evidence doctrine in domestic violence prosecutions. Such
manipulation undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system
and its promise of adjudication under rules that ensure fairness and
reliability. Furthermore, domestic violence-specific evidence rules also
harm some of the complainants that they purport to protect. By facilitating prosecutions that complainants repudiate, and undermining the
credibility of complainants whose testimony challenges the prosecution's theory, such rules reinforce an ineffective and insufficient "one
size fits all" model of criminalization. Finally, by" undermining defendants' and complainants' sense of procedural fairness, this evidentiary
manipulation may reduce both the effectiveness of criminal justice
intervention and the likelihood that complainants will enlist the assistance of the criminal justice system in the future.
In short, although the evidentiary ·manipulation that occurs in
domestic violence prosecutions may assist the state in securing convictions, it causes a number of troubling consequences. In other words,
domestic violence-specific evidence rules cause significant harm even
when they work.24
24 I. Bennett Capers recently came to a similar conclusion about rape shield laws. See I.
Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 832 (2013) ("When rape
shields do work, they do so at extraordinary cost, reinscribing the very chastity
requirement that they were intended to abolish."). The manipulation of evidentiary
doctrine is not unique to domestic violence prosecutions. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 110
Cal. Rptr. 3d 515, 521-22 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that "[d]omestic violence is but one of
the areas in which the rules of evidence have been relaxed in recent years" and identifying
elder abuse and child abuse as other examples); Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the
Application of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1585, 1601-02 (1998) (noting that the "war on drugs ... generates its own share of
evidentiary reanalysis"). However, this Article _focuses on the particular manipulation that
occurs in domestic violence prosecutions.
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I
THE EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ExcEPTIONALISM

Until shamefully recently, domestic violence was widely treated
as an issue that did not warrant public acknowledgement, let alone
intervention. Although a husband's right to subject his wife to corporal punishment had been abrogated by the end of the nineteenth
century,2s rhetoric of marital privacy and domestic harmony continued to frame violence against women as a personal matter that did
not concern the criminal justice system until the 1970s.26 Against this
backdrop of disavowal of gendered violence, second-wave feminists
began to call for acknowledgement of and response to domestic violence.27 Initially, many feminists were skeptical of the efficacy of
criminalization as a solution to this complex issue, and focused instead
on creating self-sufficient shelters and supportive services for those
impacted by domestic violence. 28 Eventually, however, they began to
"engage with the state" and target the criminal justice system as the
25 See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871) (rejecting the chastisement defense of
a man accused of assaulting his wife); see also Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2129 (1996) ("By the 1870s, there
was no judge or treatise writer in the United States who recognized a husband's
prerogative to chastise his wife."). This right of "chastisement" was a corollary to the
doctrine of "marital unity," which dictated that a woman's identity "merged" into her
husband's upon marriage. Id. at 2122-23.
26 See Siegel, supra note 25, at 2153-70 (surveying criminal and tort cases that followed
the formal repudiation of chastisement and demonstrating that courts continued to
"invoke concepts of privacy to justify giving wife beaters immunity from public and private
prosecution"); see also JEANNIE SuK, AT HOME IN THE LAw: How THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PruvACY 13 (2009) (discussing the historical
treatment of domestic violence). But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State
Intervention in the American West and Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185, 185-89
(2011) (challenging the popular assumption that the state failed to respond to domestic
violence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
27 The term "second-wave feminism" encompasses the range of feminist organizing and
theorizing that occurred "within a temporal time frame, namely the 1960s up until the
1990s." Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 Hous. L. REv. 1325, 1331 (2013). "Second-wave
feminis[ts]" were not a monolithic group, and generated "several feminist schools of
thought, ranging from purely liberal (those dedicated to giving women 'equal' rights to
men) to extremely radical (those calling for an overhaul of the 'male' legal and social
structure)." Id. at 1331-32.
28 See KRISTIN BuMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM
APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2008)
(describing the "anti-state" sentiment of early feminist organizing efforts around domestic
violence); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 56-62 (1982) (detailing the
emergence and growth of the shelter movement); SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 182-83
(providing a brief overview of the shelter movement). This "anti-state" sentiment was
reflected in the shelter movement, a grassroots effort to build self-sufficient shelters run by
and for women who experienced abuse. BuMILLER, supra, at 3.
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primary site of reform. 29 Influenced both by feminist demands for
criminal justice reform as well as a political climate that was increasingly eager to appear tough on crime, the state responded by declaring
"war" on domestic violence. 3 o
Although, from the outset of this war, the state identified
domestic violence as a criminal justice problem to be solved with criminal justice solutions, 31 it struggled to determine how to treat it relative to other crimes. Responding initially to early liberal feminist
demands for "formal equality in prosecutions,'' 32 the state characterized domestic violence as a crime like any other. The Reagan administration's 1984 Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence
Final Report, for example, declared that the government's response to
"family violence" should be guided "primarily by the nature of the
abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser." 33
In other words, there was nothing unique about domestic violence,
and the state would simply apply established criminal justice policies
and procedures to this "new" crime.
It soon became clear that the liberal feminist-influenced "add
domestic violence and stir" 34 approach to the criminalization of
domestic violence would not suffice; "[a)lthough the law formally
treated spousal battering like any other criminal assault, . . . [s)tate
actors continued to downplay the seriousness of domestic violence
cases either because of chauvinistic predispositions or because of
skepticism regarding the prospects of prosecutorial success." 35 Due to
SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 182.
See, e.g., Lynne Marek, U.S. Joining War on Domestic Violence, Cm. TRIB. (Mar. 12,
1994), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/l 994-03-12/news/9403120068_1_domestic-viol
ence-shalala-domestic-partner (quoting then-Secretary of Health and Human Services
Donna Shalala as pledging to "put the federal government back in the fray of fighting such
'terrorism in the home"'); see also Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 lowA L.
REv. 741, 798-99 (2007) ("George W. Bush advanced the domestic violence cause by
declaring 'war' on domestic violence the same way Reagan declared war on drugs.").
31 See GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting a member of the 1984 Attorney
General's Task Force on Family Violence who argued: "We believe [domestic violence] is a
criminal problem and the way to handle it is with criminal justice intervention").
32 Gruber, supra note 27, at 1361.
33 Gruber, supra note 30, at 795 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE FINAL REPORT 4 (1984)).
34 This is an adaptation of the phrase "add women and stir," which is used as a
shorthand critique in feminist theory of liberal, rights-based solutions that do not affect
substantive structural change. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1279-80 n.2 (1987) ('"Male-dominated' and 'malebiased' are the terms usually used by feminists writing within the liberal legal tradition.
Such terminology is, however, too easily read as implying that 'gender-neutral' institutions
will result if we merely 'add women and stir' .... ").
35 Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 583, 590 (2012).
29

30
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entrenched biases, police and prosecutors remained resistant to
arresting and prosecuting those accused of domestic violence-related
crimes. And even when prosecutors pursued charges, they often ran
into insurmountable evidentiary hurdles because, for a variety of reasons, complainants in domestic violence cases often were reluctant or
unwilling to participate in those prosecutions that did proceed. 36
Without defendants to prosecute or evidence with which to prosecute
them, the state could not hope to win its war against domestic
violence.
The ascending feminist legal theory of dominance feminism
assisted the state in resolving this quandary. 37 In contrast to liberal
feminism, which targets differential treatment as the source of
women's inequality and demands formal equality from the state,3 8
dominance feminism identifies women's powerlessness relative to men
as the cause of their subordination39 and supports state interventions
that correct this power imbalance. 40 According to dominance feminism, domestic violence is one of many practices-like sexual assault,
sexual harassment, prostitution, and pornography-that reinforce
male dominance over women. 41
Psychologist Lenore Walker's theories illustrated and essentially
codified the dominance feminist conception of domestic violence.
Walker posited that domestic violence occurs in an escalating cycle of
36 See infra Part IV {discussing various feminist legal scholars' critiques of the
dominance feminism perspective). It is now widely acknowledged that domestic violence
complainants decline to participate in prosecutions for many reasons other than fear of
retaliation from the defendant, including financial reliance, a desire to keep family
structures intact, distrust of the police, fear of immigration consequences for themselves or
the defendant, and love. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 70-75.
37 Dominance feminism, also known as radical feminism, emanated largely from the
work of Catharine MacKinnon. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 10-12. It became the
"prevailing feminist ideology of the 1980s and 1990s." Id. at 2. "The feminists who fought
for laws and policies to address domestic violence looked at domestic violence through the
lens of dominance feminism." Id. at 3.
38 Gruber, supra note 27, at 1332-33 ("[L)iberal feminism stands for women's formal
equality within the current social, cultural, political, and legal structure and a commitment
to women's rights as the vehicle of empowerment.").
39 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 170-71 (1988)
("[M)aleness is a form of power and femaleness is a form of powerlessness."). As Leigh
Goodmark succinctly summarizes, according to dominance feminism "men are actors,
women acted upon; men are subjects, women are objects." GooDMARK, supra note 5, at
11.
40 Gruber, supra note 35, at 592 ("Dominance feminism ... calls for the reversal of the
gender power structure by utilizing penal law to stamp out instances of sexual
domination."); see also Gruber, supra note 27, at 1343-44 (noting that dominance
feminism "sees the key to remedying women's unequal status as reconfiguring power" and
"unabashedly calls upon the state to authoritatively, even violently, enforce true equality
by stamping out instances of male sexual domination").
41 GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 11.
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violence that consists of three predictable and distinct phases: tensionbuilding, acute battering incident, and honeymoon. 42 During the
tension-building phase, the batterer subjects his victim to verbal, emotional, and perhaps minor physical abuse and she, in turn, attempts to
mollify him to prevent further abuse. 43 Tensions continue to build
until they explode in an acute battering incident in which the batterer
inflicts serious physical injury upon the victim. 44 This is followed by a
period of contrition, during which the batterer begs for forgiveness
and promises never to harm the victim again. 45 The cycle repeats endlessly, with the violence increasing and the period of contrition
shrinking, until the victim either is killed or leaves the relationship. 46
According to the corollary theory of "learned helplessness," however,
the latter result is unlikely: As a result of the incessant cycle of violence, victims of domestic violence come to believe that they are powerless to avoid or prevent future acts of abuse and "[i]nstead of
actively seeking to escape violent relationships, ... sink into passivity,
self-blame, and fatalism."47
Walker eventually expanded her theory into battered woman syndrome, which purports to explain the "psychological effects that the
trauma of battering produces in women." 48 This conceptualization of
domestic violence was initially developed to explain how female
defendants charged with killing their abusive partners reasonably
acted in self-defense. Yet, it quickly gained traction beyond the selfdefense arena to become the prevailing explanation for the dynamics
of domestic violence. 49
Although Walker's theories-and the dominance feminist perspective they embody-have been subjected to widespread criticism, 50
this conception of domestic violence was politically palatable and
42 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAITERED WOMAN 56-70 (1979).
Id. at 56-59.
44 Id. at 59-65.
45 Id. at 65-70.
46 GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 31-33 (describing Walker's conclusions); see also
WALKER, supra note 42, at 49-50 (arguing that "[r)epeated batterings ... diminish the
woman's motivation to respond," causing her to become "passive" and to believe she
cannot do anything that "will result in a favorable outcome").
47 GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 57.
48 SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 23.
49 See id. at 23-24 (detailing how battered woman syndrome became a "catch-all
phrase ... to describe a great range of issues: a woman's prior responses to violence and
the context in which those responses occurred; the dynamics of the abusive relationship; a
subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder; or woman abuse as a larger social problem").
50 See infra Part IV (reviewing and analyzing some of the major critiques directed at
this perspective).
43
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highly influential.s 1 It provided a universal explanation for a complex
problem that justified an equally universalized response: strong and
mandatory state intervention to end the relationship the victim has
been unable or unwilling to end on her own. Indeed, according to this
conceptualization of domestic violence, relationships in which
domestic violence occurred are fundamentally and irreversibly
broken, and the only solution is to end the relationship before the
victim is killed. Resistance by the victim to the imposition of this solution is further evidence of her learned helplessness and underscores
the need for intervention.s2 Thus, under this narrative, there can be no
choice about how to respond to domestic violence; each act of violence is a "prelude to murder"s 3 and could present the last chance to
intervene.
Viewed through the lens of dominance feminism, then, domestic
violence is not like any other crime, but rather is a distinctly gendered
phenomenon that reinforces the subjugation of women. Thus, dominance feminism demands not that the state treat domestic violence the
same as other crimes, but rather that it take specialized, forceful, and
affirmative actions to stop domestic violence and correct the gendered
power imbalance it perpetuates.s 4 In other words, according to dominance feminism, domestic violence is an exceptional crime that
demands an exceptional response.
Adopting this theory of domestic violence exceptionalism as well
as its interventionist mandate, individual states responded by
removing all choice from reluctant state actors.ss First, they targeted
police inaction by implementing mandatory arrest policies, which
required police to make at least one arrest in every domestic violence
51 See GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 3 (recounting the influence of dominance feminist
theory on domestic violence law and policy).
52 At least one scholar has suggested that women who resist state intervention should
be subjected to legal guardianship. Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled
Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 612 (2000).
53 SuK, supra note 26, at 36 (under the "paradigm story," domestic violence is a
"prelude to murder").
54 As Goodmark points out, this invocation of state power seems to contradict the
dominance feminist view that the state is "male jurisprudentially" and that "the law sees
and treats women the way men see and treat women." GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 11
(quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
161-62, 163 (1989)).
55 This merger between feminism and the state to "wield state power together" is an
example of what Janet Halley has called "Governance Feminism." Karen Engle et al.,
Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 224
(2003); see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 20-22 (2006) (describing Governance Feminism as a movement
characterized by feminism exerting control over legal, cultural, and familial aspects of
society by harnessing the power of the state).
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call. 56 A handful of states had adopted mandatory arrest laws by
1992,57 and those that had not quickly did so to qualify for funding
under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 58 States then
attempted to redress prosecutors' historical reluctance to prosecute
domestic violence cases by imposing "no-drop" prosecution policies in
domestic violence cases. 59 "No-drop" policies, as their name implies,
prohibit prosecutors from dismissing viable criminal charges, regardless of whether the complainant supports the prosecution and evenand most controversially-if the complainant wants the state to drop
the charges. 6o
Thus, in an attempt to keep its promise to treat domestic violence
the same as every other crime, the state, guided by dominance feminist legal theory, created a system that responds to it remarkably differently.61 From the initial report through the decision whether to
prosecute, the state's response to domestic violence has been marked
by a systematic removal of discretion, the factor that guides state
56
57

GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 107-10.
See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Haus. L. REv. 237, 239 n.2
(2005) ("By 1992, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and
Wisconsin had passed legislation mandating arrest for domestic violence.").
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(l)(A) (2012) (requiring eligible grantee states to have
laws or polices that "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based
on probable cause that an offense has been committed"). For a summary and comparison
of mandatory arrest laws, see April M. Zeoli, Alexis Norris & Hannah Brenner, A
Summary and Analysis of Warrantless Arrest Statutes for Domestic Violence in the United
States, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2811, 2815-25 (2011).
59 See GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 110-11 (recounting the proliferation of "no-drop"
prosecution policies); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of
Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998) (identifying
jurisdictions with "no-drop" prosecution policies). As Jeannie Suk recounts, another
"crucial step in the criminalization of [domestic violence]" was the emergence of the
general-purpose civil or family court protection orders, which allow individuals to seek
protection against their partners directly from the court. SuK, supra note 26, at 14.
60 Some jurisdictions adopted "hard" no-drop policies, which require prosecutors to
pursue prosecution at any cost: subpoenaing, arresting, or incarcerating a reluctant
complainant if necessary to secure her testimony at trial. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 112.
Others took a "soft" approach, attempting to overcome complainants' resistance by
providing supportive services such as courtroom advocates and rides to court. Id.
61 Michelle Madden Dempsey highlights this contradiction by noting that the calls for
law enforcement to "take domestic violence seriously" generally entail a demand to both
implement "no-drop" prosecution policies and to "treat domestic-violence cases similarly
to cases of generic violence." MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 179 (2009); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at
186 (proponents of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies believe "they send a
message that domestic violence shall not be treated as a less serious crime than violence
between strangers"); Miccio, supra note 57, at 240 (concluding that mandatory arrest
statutes require "the criminal justice system to treat male intimate crimes in a manner
equivalent to stranger crimes").
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actors in every other criminal case and increasingly defines our criminal justice system. 62 The purported aim of the targeted, specialized
response was to increase the number of domestic violence crimes that
are prosecuted, at which point domestic violence would be treated,
once again, "like every other case." 63
That the state treats domestic violence differently from other
crimes is not a new observation, and has drawn abundant scholarly
attention and debate. Unsurprisingly, those scholars who adopt the
dominance feminist perspective of domestic violence have supported
the development of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies64 and pushed for even stronger state interventions aimed at subjecting batterers to criminal punishment and ending relationships in
which domestic violence occurs. 65 In contrast, as will be discussed further in Part IV, many others, including anti-essentialist feminist legal
scholars, have critiqued the dominance feminist perspective for overlooking the needs and desires of those who do not wish, for a variety
of reasons, to invoke the punitive power of the state in responding to
their abusive partner. 66 Accordingly, anti-essentialist theorists have
pushed for the development of extracriminal responses to domestic
violence that are responsive to the particular needs of those involved.
And yet, while scholars have offered diverse perspectives on the
back-end efficacy of criminalization as the solution to this entrenched
social problem67 and the propriety of the front-end mandatorization
of the government's response in service of that solution,68 these
debates largely overlook what happens in "the middle," specifically
62 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505, 509 (2001) ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass
into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to
prison and for how long."). In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, however, the Supreme Court
nevertheless ruled that the "well established tradition of police discretion" continues to
"coexist[] with apparently mandatory arrest statutes." 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005).
63 Burke, supra note 5, at 611-12.
64 See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 12, at 1857 ("The societal benefits gained [from
mandatory policies] far outweigh any short-term costs to women's autonomy and collective
safety."); Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 173, 182 (1997) (arguing in support of "[a]ggressive prosecution of domestic
violence offenders," because such a policy "rejects the notion that victims should be given
the choice of whether to press or drop charges").
65 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 962 (calling for a stronger and more specific
criminal law response to domestic violence).
66 See, e.g., GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 106-35 (critiquing mandatory policies for
depriving complainants of autonomy and agency).
67 See Brenner, supra note 11, at 323-26 (summarizing competing views of
criminalization).
68 For an overview of these competing perspectives on mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 184-88.
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whether the processes used to adjudicate allegations of domestic violence are or should be guided by the same domestic violence exceptionalism that has shaped the state's front-end responses. 69 As a
result, the scholarship leaves relatively untouched the presumption
that, once the adjudicatory phase is underway, the state's response to
domestic violence is again guided by liberal, equality-focused
principles.
The few scholars who have examined evidentiary doctrine in
domestic violence prosecutions universally support the creation of
specialized rules in service of a strong criminalization-focused
response. 70 Emanating from a dominance feminist perspective, these
analyses largely follow the same syllogistic reasoning enlisted in support of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies: Domestic violence
is substantively different from other crimes, and traditional evidence
rules (like traditional arrest and prosecution policies) do not account
for these differences, rendering conviction difficult. Given the escalating cycle of violence, if the defendant is not convicted, he will
assault the complainant again, possibly killing her. In order to secure
conviction and save the complainant's life, therefore, it is essential
that the state adapt its evidence rules. 71 Characterizing specialized evidence rules as appropriate and necessary weapons in the effort to end
domestic violence,72 they call for rules that reflect the prevailing, dominance feminist-influenced, iteration of domestic violence exceptionalism embodied by mandatory arrest and prosecution policies.
As the next section demonstrates, this notion has gained traction
in some jurisdictions. Courts and legislatures draw on these presumptions to conclude that domestic violence is substantively different
69 As noted above, the widespread scholarly attention to the Confrontation Clause
after Crawford v. Washington is an exception to this general trend. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
70 For description of various proposals of scholars to amend evidentiary rules, see
sources cited supra note 17. One commentator has even suggested that the application of
the character evidence ban in domestic violence prosecutions amounts to a modern-day
rule of chastisement and perpetuates "the legal sanction of domestic violence." Andrew
King-Ries, True to Character: Honoring the Intellectual Foundations of the Character
Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 23 ST. Lorns U. PuB. L. REV. 313,
314-15 (2004).
71 See King-Ries, supra note 70, at 315 (summarizing the arguments of those who
advocate for a change in evidentiary law in domestic violence prosecutions as follows:
"[D]omestic violence is a societal epidemic; domestic violence prosecutions are difficult;
the particular rule change will make it easier to prosecute domestic violence perpetrators;
more successful prosecution will reduce the societal epidemic of domestic violence;
therefore, the law should be changed.").
72 Myrna S. Raeder, for example, identifies "appropriate evidentiary rules" as one of
the changes that will "diminish the untold suffering of women and the silent victims-their
children." Raeder, supra note 17, at 1485.
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from other crimes, and that this difference requires specialized (and
more permissive) evidence rules. In so doing, they enlist theories
developed to be a shield in the defense of women accused of killing
their abusive partners as a sword with which to justify admission of
inculpatory evidence against men accused of domestic violence.
II
Ev1DENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ExcEPTIONALISM

Although the mandatorization of the police and prosecutorial
response to domestic violence is perhaps an extreme example, it is not
uncommon for the state to adopt policies aimed at increasing arrests
for and prosecutions of certain crimes, especially those that are "new"
or considered particularly socially destructive. The 1980s, for example,
witnessed a wave of new policies and procedures to target drunk
driving, 73 and more recently legislatures and police departments have
taken action to "get[] tough on bullying." 74 Yet operating in the background of these tough-on-crime policies is the promise that once a
defendant enters the criminal justice system he will be afforded a fair
and just adjudication of guilt, regardless of the strength of society's
disdain for the offense with which he is charged. 75

73 See JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at xv-xviii (1989)
(recounting the rise and legislative successes of the anti-drunk driving movement).
74 Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1669, 1696-97 (2012) (describing recent legislative actions aimed at "getting tough on
bullying"); see also Jessica R. Key, Getting Tough on Bullying: Can Extreme Measures
Solve This Issue?, INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER (May 15, 2014), http://www.indianapolisrecor
der .com/news/prin t_high lights/ article _85b53 fb8-dc6f-11 e3-854b-001 a4bcf887 a.html
(describing ongoing attempts to criminalize bullying in Carson, California). Of course,
which crimes are considered worthy of social reprobation can change. Some actions, such
as domestic violence, can be transformed from a legally sanctioned activity to a serious
crime. See supra Part I (describing the transformation of how domestic violence is viewed
in the eyes of the law). Other activity once deemed intractably criminal, such as marijuana
use, may be decriminalized. See Dan Frosch, Measures to Legalize Marijuana Are Passed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A18 (describing the legalization of marijuana through ballot
measures in Colorado, Michigan, and Maine).
75 For example, despite the widespread debate about the invocation of the "public
safety" exception to Miranda in the attempt to obtain a statement from Boston Marathon
bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, commentators invoked as a point of pride that he
will enjoy a fair trial. See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, What We Want from the Marathon Bombing
Trial, Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/04/26/whatwant-from-marathon-bombing-trial/91Hq5V5zcddBlwoFNTK310/story.html ("Subjecting
Tsarnaev to the particular power of our legal system carries its own symbolic victory ... :
By treating him the same way we treat everyone we prosecute, we will deny him whatever
special status he sought in carrying out the attacks.").
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Evidence rules play a central role in the assurance of a fair and
impartial trial. 76 As a general matter, evidence rules either facilitate
the adjudicatory process or promote a substantive policy of the law.77
Most evidence rules fall within the former category and are drafted to
promote values intrinsic to the adjudicatory process such as efficiency,
accuracy, and fairness. 78 Significantly, those few that fall in the latter
category promote substantive policies extrinsic to the subject matter
of litigation, 79 such as encouraging candor between spousess0 or the
making of settlement offers. 81 Whether intrinsically or extrinsically
oriented, the rules purport to reflect transsubstantive values and policies that are independent of the particular matter at issue in
litigation. s2
76 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) ("These rules ... safeguard
[defendants] from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty
and property.").
77 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of
the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1186 (1998).
78 The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, must be construed to ensure fairness
with an eye toward serving dual ends: "ascertaining the truth" and "securing a just
determination." FED. R. Evm. 102. The Rules also must be read to eliminate expense and
promote evidence law. Id.; see Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 168 (2006) (noting that most evidence rules are
"(internally) epistemic" and are designed to increase "the accuracy and efficiency of fact
finding under circumstances of jury decision making").
79 See Leonard, supra note 77, at 1187 ("Rules of this type do not primarily serve
important substantive legal policies or values."); Schauer, supra note 78, at 167-68 (noting
that some evidence rules are extrinsically oriented and "designed to create the proper
incentives for socially desirable out-of-court conduct" and do not serve epistemic goals).
80 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (holding that a spousal privilege
rule that vests the privilege in the witness-spouse "furthers the important public interest in
marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs").
81 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 408(a)(l) (making inadmissible any evidence of "furnishing,
promising, or offering-or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept-a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim").
82 See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306 (1995) (arguing that a "key assumption[)" underlying the
Federal Rules of Evidence is that "the evidence rules, for the most part, should apply the
same way in different kinds of cases and treat different types of litigants similarly"); J.
Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551 (1980) ("A basic premise of evidentiary rules is
that they ... do not develop differently for each substantive crime and civil cause of
action."); see also Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent
American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent
Development, 1994 Wrs. L. REv. 1119, 1174 (1994) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence are a
paradigm of transsubstantive rules that are applicable across the near-entirety of the
litigation landscape."). Although the transsubstantivity principle has existed since the
seventeenth century, D. Michael Risinger, Guilt vs. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for
Trying Factual Innocence Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 885, 886 n.3 (2008), the notion that evidentiary rules should transcend the
boundary between civil and criminal law has been called into doubt. Raeder, supra note 24,
at 1587-88.
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This intrinsic/extrinsic divide promotes the development of evidence rules as outcome-neutral guidelines that ensure a fair and accurate process or encourage certain out-of-court behavior generally,
regardless of the offense with which the defendant has been charged. 83
As the following discussion demonstrates, however, courts and legislatures in many jurisdictions have blurred this traditional divide
between intrinsically and extrinsically oriented rules in domestic violence prosecutions by adopting specialized evidence rules that promote a substantive policy goal intrinsic to the prosecution: redressing
the social ill of domestic violence through conviction. Drawing on the
dominance-feminist informed explanation of domestic violence as cyclical, escalating, incapacitating, and requiring immediate and
unflinching state intervention, courts and legislatures in these jurisdictions reason that domestic violence is substantively different from
other crimes, and that this difference requires specialized evidence
rules. This section demonstrates this phenomenon through the examination of three trends in domestic violence prosecutions: the admission of prior acts of domestic violence to prove propensity, the
expansion of the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception
to include statements of identification, and the increasing elasticity of
the forfeiture by wrongdoing standard to admit evidence otherwise
precluded by the hearsay proscription or the Confrontation Clause.
These domestic violence-specific rules and standards differ from each
other in many ways. One has been codified, the others developed in
common law. Some reflect the explicit rejection of traditional evidentiary principles, others, the implicit conclusion that traditional standards mean something different in the context of domestic violence.
What unites these diverse rules and standards is that each is guided
not by traditional evidentiary principles, but rather tenets of domestic
violence exceptionalism, and each aims to enable admission of evidence that comports with prevailing presumptions about domestic violence-and to override that which does not.
A.

Character Evidence Exceptions

The character evidence rule prohibits prosecutors from introducing evidence of a defendant's character, including prior crimes or
bad acts, to demonstrate that he acted in conformity with that char83 See Edward K. Cheng, The Perils of Evidentiary Manipulation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 207, 211 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/
cheng.pdf ("Evidence rules arguably carry special legitimacy because they are--0r are at
least supposed to be-transsubstantive. Being transsubstantive ensures greater neutrality
and honesty, because evidentiary doctrines are double-edged swords that can both help
and hinder substantive objectives.").
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acter on the date of the charged incident. 84 Character evidence is
excluded not because it is irrelevant, but rather because a fact finder
may deem it too relevant; "it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge." 85 The rule thus reflects a fairness-based policy judgment that
the danger that a fact finder will give undue weight to past bad acts is
so great that this evidence must be excluded, regardless (or because)
of its probative value.86
While the character evidence rule precludes admission of evidence of prior bad acts solely to prove that a defendant has a bad
character that predisposes him to committing the charged offense, it
does not proscribe admission of acts that are relevant for a nonpropensity purpose such as motive, intent, knowledge, or lack of mistake or accident. 87 Nor does it prohibit reference to acts that are so
"inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense that the prosecution cannot comprehensibly convey the allegations without referencing them.88 At its heart, the ban on propensity reasoning is rooted
in a "jealous regard for the liberty of the individual";89 it seeks to
protect the possibility that a defendant's future is not determined by
his past, but rather that he retains the free will to break from his past
and change his behavior. It reflects a belief that even the "most guilty
criminal may be innocent of other offenses charged against him, of
which, if fairly tried he might acquit himself." 90 Thus, it allows a
defendant to "start[] his life afresh when he stands before the jury."91
By preventing the fact finder from convicting a defendant for what he
has done in the past, the character evidence ban upholds the pillars of
our criminal justice system: the presumption of innocence and the rea84 This rule is codified as FED. R. Evrn. 404, and every state has adopted it. Leonard,
supra note 77, at 1167.
85 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
86 Id. ("The overriding policy of excluding [character] evidence, despite its admitted
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion
of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.").
87 The leading case on this issue is People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).
These exceptions are codified in FED. R. Evrn. 404(b )(2). Evidence admitted under any of
these exceptions, like all other relevant evidence, may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. FED. R. Evrn. 403.
88 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae: A
Procedural Approach to Untangling the "Inextricably Intertwined" Theory for Admitting
Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CA'IH. U. L. REv. 719, 726 (2010)
(discussing the justification for the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine).
89 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293.
90 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 300.
91 People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
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sonable doubt standard. 92 It is so crucial to ensuring a fair and just
adjudication and "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence" that it
assumes "almost constitutional proportions. "93
It was unsurprising, therefore, that when Congress exempted
sexual assault and child molestation crimes from the centuries-long
ban on propensity evidence through the adoption of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414, 94 the move drew widespread criticism from
practitioners, 95 the American Bar Association, 96 evidence scholars, 97
and even some feminist activists and legal theorists. 98 Interestingly,
these Rules were passed as part of the same Act that initially author92 See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978)) ("One of the dangers
inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that the jury may convict the
defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense."); Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 572-75 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring) ("Evidence of prior convictions has been
forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently
charged."). The Molineux court stressed that the propensity evidence ban distinguished the
American common law system-a "product of all the wisdom and humanity of all the
ages"-from civil law systems in which a defendant's history "is an open book" and
"[e]very crime or indiscretion of his life may be laid bare to feed the presumption of guilt."
Molineux, 61 N.E. at 300.
93 FED. R. Evro. 404 advisory committee's note. Some, including Justice Warren, have
suggested that violation of this rule offends the Due Process Clause. Spencer, 385 U.S. at
573-75 (Warren, J., concurring). But see Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the
False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1487, 1517-18 (2005)
(noting that every federal appellate court to consider the constitutionality of FED. R. Evro.
413-414, which exempt sexual assault offenses from the propensity ban, has held that they
do not violate due process).
94 Rules 413 and 414 authorize admission of prior acts of sexual assault and child
molestation, respectively, for "any matter to which it is relevant" in criminal prosecutions
for those crimes. FED. R. Evro. 413(a), 414(a). Congress also adopted Rule 415 to
authorize admission of this evidence in civil proceedings for relief "based on a party's
alleged sexual assault or child molestation." FED. R. Evro. 415.
95 E.g., Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 57, 58-59 (1995).
96 Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the
House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 353 (1995) ("Rules 413-415
are ill designed and raise troubling policy issues.").
97 E.g., Leonard, supra note 82, at 306 ("These changes do not bode well for the future
stability of the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall,
"Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates
the Due Process Clause, 28 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that Rules 413 and 414
violate due process).
98 See Capers, supra note 24, at 845 n.94 ("[T]he National Organization of Women's
Legal Defense Fund opposed the rule out of concern that it would diminish basic
safeguards accorded criminal defendants."). Of course, some feminist scholars supported
the rules. See, e.g., Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 501, 507-10 (1996) (arguing that FED. R.
Evro. 413-415 "provide greater justice for victims of sex crimes").
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ized VA WA, 9 9 which requires states to adopt mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence offenses to qualify for federal funding
under the Act. 100 Yet, even then-Senator Joseph Biden, VA W A's primary sponsor, 101 vociferously opposed the adoption of these rules. 10 2
As the following analysis demonstrates, ma_ny jurisdictions have
also explicitly or implicitly eviscerated the propensity ban in domestic
violence prosecutions. A handful of states, taking a cue from Federal
Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, explicitly authorize the use of propensity reasoning in domestic violence prosecutions. 103 Many more do so
under the guise of a purportedly nonpropensity "domestic violence
context" theory to demonstrate the "nature of the relationship"
between the defendant and complainant or to help the jury assess the
credibility of a recanting complainant. 104 Yet, despite the extensive
scholarly attention to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 105 this
trend in domestic violence prosecutions has developed relatively
unnoticed.

1.

"Domestic Violence Propensity" Exceptions

Seven states have amended their evidence rules or adopted statutes to authorize the admission of prior acts of domestic violence in
domestic violence-related prosecutions. 106 Four of these states99 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
100 See supra Part I (describing requirements that VAWA imposes on states).
101 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991) (describing the introduction of VAWA).
102 Senator Biden characterized FED. R. Evm. 413-415 as a "very dangerous
amendment," 139 CoNG. REC. 27,550 (1993), and said the rules violated "every basic tenet
of our system." 140 CoNG. REC. 18,930 (1994).
103 Many jurisdictions also admit prior abusive acts in civil protection order proceedings.
See Coburn v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951, 958-59 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) ("In holding that
evidence of past abuse is relevant in determining the present need for a protective order,
this Court follows the trend of many jurisdictions.").
104 See infra notes 133-34 (describing how states authorize propensity reasoning under
various rationales).
105 See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Criminal History: The Trouble with
Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REv. 201, 251-52 n.342 (2005) (listing articles supporting and
opposing FED. R. Evm. 413-414).
106 CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1109 (West 2009) (excepting "evidence ·of the defendant's
commission of other domestic violence" from the state's ban on character evidence);
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5 (West 2014) (authorizing admission of "evidence of
any other acts of domestic violence between the defendant and the victim named in the
information, and between the defendant and other persons ... as provided in subsection
(3) of this section"); 725 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.4 (West 2014) ("[E]vidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible,
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter_ to which it is relevant."); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.27b (West 2014) ("[E]vidence of the defendant's commission of
other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant .... ");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West 2015) ("Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

418

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:397

California, Alaska, Illinois, and Michigan-authorize admission of
prior acts of domestic violence for any relevant purpose, including to
establish the defendant's propensity to commit domestic violence. 107
These domestic violence propensity statutes reflect the same
theory of domestic violence exceptionalism that underlies mandatory
arrest and no-drop prosecution policies, particularly its presumptively
cyclical nature. The Committee on Public Safety Report submitted to
the California Assembly in support of the state's propensity statute
concluded, for example, that the "propensity inference" was "particularly appropriate" in domestic violence prosecutions because "ongoing violence and abuse is the norm in domestic violence cases." 108 It
continued, "[n]ot only is there a great likelihood that any one battering episode is part of a larger scheme of dominance and control,
that scheme usually escalates in frequency and severity." 109

against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is
admissible [unless overly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading]."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.063(13) (West 2015) ("Evidence of similar criminal convictions of domestic
violence ... within five years of the offense at issue, shall be admissible for the purposes of
showing a past history of domestic violence."); ALASKA R. Evm. 404(b)(4) ("In a
prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence or of interfering with a report of a
crime involving domestic violence, evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by
the defendant against the same or another person ... is admissible.").
107 CAL. Evm. CooE § 1109; 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.4; MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 768.27b; ALASKA R. Evrn. 404(b )(4). Although the Minnesota statute also
authorizes admission of evidence of prior domestic abuse subject only to the restriction
against evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair
prejudice, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20, the Minnesota Supreme Court has limited its
application to the purportedly nonpropensity "relationship" theory of admissibility. See
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004) (emphasizing the relevance of such
evidence when it occurred between the victim and defendant). Accordingly, this exception
will be analyzed as one of the "nonpropensity" domestic violence exception, infra Part
11.A.2. The Missouri statute restricts admissibility to convictions of domestic violence
offenses within the preceding five years and authorizes admission to demonstrate "a past
history of domestic violence." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063. Though the Missouri Supreme
Court has not considered this statute, it has ruled that there are "no exceptions" to the rule
against propensity evidence. State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. 2007) (en bane).
This statute, therefore, will also be discussed as a "nonpropensity" exception, infra Part
11.A.2. Colorado courts have interpreted the state statute as requiring that prior acts
evidence be relevant for a nonpropensity purpose. See, e.g., People v. Raglin, 21 P.3d 419,
424-25 (Colo. App. 2000), overruled by Fain v. People, 329 P.3d 270, 274 (Colo. 2014)
(upholding admission of prior acts under CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5 because the
trial court implicitly found them relevant for a nonpropensity purpose).
108 CAL. AssEMB. CoMM. Pus. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1876, at 3 (1996).
109 Id. The Colorado legislature similarly found that "domestic violence is frequently
cyclical in nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of harm with escalating levels
of seriousness," and declared that "evidence of similar transactions can be helpful and is
necessary in some situations in prosecuting crimes involving domestic violence." COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5.
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Similarly, the Illinois statute was created because "domestic violence is a recurring crime," 110 and a "rationale" proffered for the
Michigan law was that defendants charged with domestic violence
offenses "often" had "committed similar acts of abuse in the past."111
Thus, proponents concluded the "rules of evidence regarding past
actions ... should not apply in domestic violence cases." 112 In other
words, the cyclical and recurrent nature of domestic violence differentiates it from other crimes, requiring different evidence rules.
At first blush, this justification for domestic violence propensity
statutes sounds like a straightforward truth rationale: that propensity
reasoning should be allowed in domestic violence prosecutions
because the inference is likely to be true. While perhaps viscerally
compelling, the truth rationale is doctrinally unsatisfying. The ban on
propensity reasoning exists not because the propensity inference may
be false, but rather because the jury may give the inference too much
weight, convicting based on the strength of the inference instead of
the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. Thus, even absolute accuracy would not justify an exception to this centuries-old, fairness-based rule.
In any event, a truth rationale does not fully explain the impetus
behind the adoption of these statutes. If the statutes were concerned
simply with admitting evidence to support an inference about the
defendant's behavioral pattern against the complainant, they would
only admit evidence of prior acts committed within the context of that
intimate relationship. Instead, however, they also permit admission of
past abusive acts against other intimate partners. 113
In the Michigan case of People v. Cameron, for example, the
defendant was charged with assault and battery against his girl110 See People v. Dabbs, 919 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ill. App. 2009) (quoting state
representative during proceedings to adopt the statute).
111 MICH. S. FISCAL AGENCY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 120 & 263, at 1 (2006).
112 Id. at 3.
113 The Alaska and Michigan statutes specifically authorize admission of prior acts of
domestic violence against former partners. See statutes cited supra note 106. The
California and Illinois statutes simply permit introduction of other offenses of domestic
violence, and their legislative history and application confirm that they extend to acts
against former partners. People v. Dabbs, 940 N.E.2d 1088, 1098-99 (Ill. 2010) (reviewing
legislative history of the Illinois propensity statute and noting that it is intended to
demonstrate that "the present victim is worthy of belief because her experience is
corroborated by the experience of another victim of the same abuser") (emphasis added);
CAL. AssEMB. COMM. Pus. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 5 (discussing California propensity
statute's intent to admit domestic violence offenses "committed against the victim of the
charged crime or another similarly situated person"); see also People v. Cabrera, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding admission of testimony by two former
girlfriends about acts of domestic violence under California's domestic violence propensity
statute).
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friend. 114 In addition to evidence of six acts of violence the defendant
had committed against the complainant in the years before the
charged crime,11 5 the trial court also admitted, under the state's
domestic violence propensity statute, the testimony of a woman the
defendant had dated for a few months-seven years before the
charged incident-about his violent behavior towards her during their
relationship. 11 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's ruling that this evidence demonstrated the defendant's "propensity to commit acts of violence against women who were or had
been romantically involved with him." 117
As Cameron illustrates, domestic violence propensity statutes
reflect a presumption not just about the nature of domestic violence,
but about the nature of domestic violence offenders. They allow the
fact finder to infer that domestic violence offenders are apt to recidivate not only within a particular relationship, but also in all intimate
relationships. 118 But the statutes are not motivated by a simple judgment that domestic violence offenders exhibit high recidivism rates.
As Lisa Marie De Sanctis, author of the California propensity
statute, 119 acknowledged, a high recidivism rate was not "the only justification for using a propensity inference" in domestic violence prosecutions.120 Indeed, if increasing the accuracy of fact-finding were the
only aim of these statutes, their proponents would support the abolition of the propensity evidence ban for all crimes characterized by a
high recidivism rate, such as property or drug offenses. 121 But instead,
they suggest the ban is appropriate in other prosecutions. 122
806 N.W.2d 371, 372 {Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 374-75.
116 Id. at 375.
117 Id. at 378.
118 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 515, 524 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that
the domestic violence propensity statute reflects a conclusion about the "psychological
dynamic" of domestic violence that is "not necessarily involved in other types of crimes").
119 See De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 361-62 (describing the process of amending Senate
Bill 1976 to include De Sanctis's proposal).
120 Id. at 390.
121 A recent Department of Justice study of state prisoners released in 2005
demonstrated that 82.l % of property offenders were convicted of a new offense within five
years of release, compared to 76.9% of drug offenders and 71.3% of violent offenders.
MATTHEW R. DuRosE ET AL., BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO
2010, at 9 tbl.10 (2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdUrprts05p0510.pdf.
122 For example, Judith Armatta argues that the character evidence ban is "useful in
nondomestic violence assault cases to ensure that the defendant is not convicted because
he has a bad character or reputation," but that its abolition in domestic violence cases is
necessary to "establish the seriousness of an ongoing pattern of violent behavior."
Armatta, supra note 17, at 819. However, some who advocate for domestic violence
propensity exceptions also support the adoption of propensity exceptions for sexual assault
114
115
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At their core, domestic violence propensity statutes reflect a presumption about the difference between the psychology of domestic
violence offenders and those who commit other types of crimes. They
presume not simply that domestic violence offenders often recidivate,
but that they are unable to refrain from doing so. In other words, their
past behavior shows that they lack the free will to change their
behavior. 123 From this perspective, it is "[c]ommon sense" not only to
distinguish domestic violence offenders from other offenders,124 but
also to deprive them of the benefit of the "fresh start" before the jury
that the propensity evidence ban protects. 1 2s
Understood through this psychological rationale, domestic violence propensity statutes are concerned not just with holding the
defendant accountable for his past actions, but also preventing the
inevitable future violence that will occur if he is not convicted. Proponents of propensity statutes assert that one of the only plausibly effective interventions that can change a domestic violence offender's
behavior is the intervention of the criminal justice system. 126 Thus,
they underscore the perceived urgency of interposing the criminal jusand child molestation prosecutions. See, e.g., De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 387-88
(modeling a proposal to create a specialized evidentiary rule for the admissibility of
uncharged offenses of domestic violence in domestic violence prosecutions on FED. R.
Evm. 413-414, which accomplish the same for victims of rape and sexual molestation).
123 This argument was made explicitly in support of sex abuse and child molestation
propensity statutes, which served as a model for domestic violence propensity statutes. See
CAL. AssEMB. CoMM. PuB. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 3 (noting that the Bill that became
California's domestic violence propensity statute was "modeled on" the state's sex offense
propensity statute). For example, David J. Karp, the author of FED. R. Evm. 413-415,
contrasted the behaviors of "[o]rdinary people," who "do not commit outrages against
others because they have relatively little inclination to do so," with a person who has
committed rape or child molestation, whose past conduct, he argued, "provides evidence
that he has the combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the
commission of such crimes, that he lacks effective inhibitions against acting on these
impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter him." Evidence of Propensity and
Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 15, 20 (1994); see
also Johnson, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 524 n.9 (noting that the legislative history of California's
sex offense propensity statute "suggests an underlying psychological abnormality that
makes such evidence especially probative"). De Sanctis heavily relied on Karp's reasoning
to justify California's domestic violence propensity statute. See De Sanctis, supra note 17,
at 383-85 (citing Karp's reasoning to describe arguments in favor of FED. R. Evm.
413-414).
124 De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 388 ("Common sense suggests that a person with a
history of beating his intimate partner stands on different ground than does a person
without that history.").
12s Contra People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (contending the ban on
propensity reasons that a defendant should "start[ ] his life afresh when he stands before
the jury").
126 CAL AssEMB. CoMM. PuB. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 4 ("[C]riminal prosecution is
one of the few factors which may interrupt the escalating pattern of domestic violence
.... ").
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tice system between the defendant and his partner, thereby breaking
the "cycle" and preventing future inevitable acts of violence. For
example, the authors of the California domestic violence propensity
statute vividly described the perceived stakes of sticking with the
status quo: "[W]e will continue to see cases where perpetrators of this
violence will beat their intimate partners, even kill them, and go on to
beat or kill the next intimate partner." 127 From this perspective,
domestic violence propensity statutes are an appropriate and essential
"tool for law enforcement and victims" 128 in the war against domestic
violence.
2.

"Domestic Violence Context" Exceptions

As mentioned above, the character evidence rule does not prohibit the introduction of prior bad acts that are relevant for a nonpropensity purpose, such as establishing motive, intent, or modus
operandi. 129 These malleable and diverse nonpropensity theories of
admissibility can be and have been used to admit prior acts of abuse in
many domestic violence prosecutions. 130 Nevertheless, legislatures or
appellate courts in at least ten states have supplemented this list of
generally applicable theories with a specialized theory that will be
referred to here as the "domestic violence context" exception.13 1
Like domestic violence propensity statutes, the domestic violence
context exception reflects the presumption that domestic violence
occurs according to a predictable cycle of violence, that this cyclical
nature differentiates domestic violence from other crimes, and that
127 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). Tellingly, this statute was originally denominated the
"Nicole Brown Simpson Law," because "its sponsors were outraged by the exclusion of
prior acts evidence in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson." Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues
in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687, 701-02 (2003).
128 People v. Dabbs, 919 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ill. App. 2009).
129 See supra note 87. David P. Leonard identified these as "theoretically noncharacter"
purposes, since their application often is difficult to distinguish from character reasoning.
Leonard, supra note 77, at 1166.
130 See, e.g., People v. Illgen, 583 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ill. 1991) ("[E]vidence of the
defendant's prior unprovoked assaults on his wife tended to negate the likelihood that the
shooting was an. accident and thereby tended to prove his intent."); State v. Taylor, 689
N.W.2d 116, 128 (Iowa 2004) (admitting prior acts of abuse to establish motive and intent);
Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 944 (Wyo. 1983) (stating a defendant's prior abuse of victim
provides "insight into a person's feelings for another which may help establish motive")
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1995).
131 "Exception" is perhaps a misnomer, since this is technically not an exception to the
ban on propensity reasoning, but rather a purportedly nonpropensity theory of
admissibility. But since this section concludes that it actually is a justification for admitting
propensity evidence, it will be denominated an exception.
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this difference justifies admission of prior bad acts. 132 But unlike the
propensity statutes, which eschew the propensity ban altogether, the
domestic violence context exception purports to uphold the traditional propensity ban by admitting prior abusive acts for a nonpropensity purpose: contextualizing the alleged behavior. Courts reason that
evidence admitted under this exception does not demonstrate a defendant's propensity to commit abusive acts, but rather demonstrates the
"nature of the relationship" within which the charged crime occurred
(the "relationship rationale") 133 or provides information relevant to
the jury's assessment of the recanting complainant's credibility (the
"credibility rationale"). 134 As will be demonstrated below, however,
132 In analyzing the Minnesota "domestic violence context" exception, for example, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that it was "appropriate" to treat prior acts of
domestic violence differently from other prior acts evidence because "[d]omestic abuse is
unique in that it typically occurs in the privacy of the home, it frequently involves a pattern
of activity that may escalate over time, and it is often underreported." State v. McCoy, 682
N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted).
133 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063(13) (West 2015) (authorizing admission of prior
conviction of domestic violence to demonstrate "a past history of domestic violence");
Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (admitting prior acts of abuse to
"illuminat[e] the relationship between the defendant and victim"); State v. Green, 652 P.2d
697, 699, 701 (Kan. 1982) (finding evidence of "marital discord" admissible to demonstrate
the "relationship between the parties"); McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159 (interpreting MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 634.20 as authorizing admission of prior acts of abuse to "illuminate[] the ...
relationship" between the defendant and the complainant and put the alleged crime in "the
context of [that] relationship"); People v. Shorey, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (App. Div. 1991)
(admitting prior acts evidence "as background material in order for the jury to understand
the nature of" the abusive relationship); State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998)
(holding evidence of prior instances of abuse was relevant "to portray the history
surrounding the abusive relationship" and put the allegedly abusive "behavior" in
"context").
134 See State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 207 (Haw. 1996) (finding prior abusive acts
admissible to show the "context of the relationship," when the relationship is offered as a
possible explanation for the complainant's recantation); Commonwealth v. Butler, 839
N.E.2d 307, 313 (Mass. 2005) ("The jury were entitled to consider evidence that depicted
the hostile relationship between [the victim] and the defendant [in order to help] explain
her recantation, so that they could adequately assess her credibility .... "); McCoy, 682
N.W.2d at 161 (authorizing admission of defendant's alleged prior abuse of complainant,
who testified she could not remember what she told the police about the alleged incident,
provided the jury with "a context with which it could better judge the credibility of the
principals in the relationship"); Bigpond v. State, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Nev. 2012)
("[V]ictim's prior accusations of domestic violence were relevant because they provide
insight into the relationship and the victim's possible reason for recanting her prior
accusations, which would assist the jury in adequately assessing the victim's credibility.");
Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13 (stating that because "[v]ictims of domestic abuse are likely to
change their stories out of fear of retribution, or even out of misguided affection,"
evidence of prior abuse can elucidate "why the victim is less than candid in her testimony
and allows [the jury] to decide more accurately which of the victim's statements more
reliably reflect reality" (citations omitted)); State v. Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 133 (Wash.
2008) ("(P]rior acts of domestic violence, involving the defendant and the crime victim, are
admissible in order to assist the jury in judging the credibility of a recanting victim.").
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each of these rationales in fact requires the fact finder to draw the
impermissible propensity inference.
The "relationship rationale" focuses on the presumptively cyclical
nature of domestic violence. Domestic assaults are, like most crimes,
transaction-based offenses committed at a certain date and time.13 5
Many domestic violence assault defendants are charged under general
assault statutes; 136 others are charged under domestic violence-specific
assault statutes, which differ from the general statutes only through
the addition of an element that the assault was committed against an
intimate partner or family member. 137 Nevertheless, courts applying
the relationship ·rationale look beyond the elements of the crime to
the prevailing stereotypes about domestic violence to conclude that, in
order to assess whether a domestic violence defendant committed a
single assaultive act, the jury must learn whether he has committed
similar acts in the past.
For example, in State v. Sanders, the leading Vermont decision
addressing the domestic violence context exception, the Vermont
Supreme Court reasoned that prior acts of domestic violence were
admissible in a prosecution for a single assault because domestic violence is "controlling behavior aimed at gaining another's compliance
through multiple. incidents. " 138 It concluded that without knowledge of
the prior abusive acts, the present allegation of abuse would seem
"incongruous and incredible. " 139 Thus, the court ruled that evidence
of prior acts was properly admitted for the nonpropensity purpose of
"portray[ing] the history surrounding the abusive relationship," and
"providing the needed context for the behavior in issue," specifically
"an understanding of defendant's actions on the date in question." 140
The "credibility rationale," by contrast, focuses on the presumptive psychological effects of domestic violence on the complainant.
135 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts Ill & IV, 87
CoLuM. L. REv. 920, 934 (1987) (noting that the system's transaction-based character has

"deep roots" and that the "very nature of criminal punishment" requires that "[b]efore the
state can deprive a citizen of liberty in a punitive way," the individual must commit "some
concrete prohibited act"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 972 (observing that most
paradigmatic criminal offenses are "transaction-bound"). While some have criticized the
limitations of this transaction-based model for failing to reflect the persistent nature of
battering, see, e.g., id. (criticizing the model for failing to address nonphysical forms of
abuse that are part of the "full spectrum of battering conduct"), it is the current approach
the criminal justice system uses, so this Article assesses courts' and legislatures' reasoning
within that context.
136 Burke, supra note 5, at 558.
137 Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
138 716 A.2d at 13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
139 Id. (citations omitted).
140 Id.
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Courts reason that, as a result of the dynamics of domestic violence
relationships, complainants are likely to lie to protect their abusive
partners from punishment, 141 themselves from future harm, and/or
their relationship. 142 Therefore, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence is essential to the jury's ability to assess the credibility of complainants who have recanted their allegations of abuse. Significantly,
this rationale is used to undermine the credibility of complainants the
prosecution calls to testify, despite knowing that they will not inculpate
the defendant. 143 For example, in Commonwealth v. Butler, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that absent evidence that the
defendant had abused the complainant in the years leading up to the
charged assault, it would have had "difficulty" understanding why the
complainant-whom the prosecution called as its first witness, despite
her pre-trial recantation-"was testifying that the defendant had not
harmed her or behaved criminally." 144 Therefore, the jury was "entitled to consider evidence that depicted the hostile relationship
between [the complainant] and the defendant and helped to explain
her recantation, so that they could adequately assess her credibility, a
central issue at trial."145
Rhetorically, these rationales sound like a variation of the "inextricably intertwined" theory for admitting prior bad acts, under which
courts will admit prior acts that are so closely related to the charged
crime that proof of their commission is essential to convey a comprehensible narrative to the jury. 146 Yet, unlike the inextricably intertwined theory, which is limited to prior acts that are so "causally,

141 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 206 (Haw. 1996) (crediting prosecution's
argument that prior abusive acts by the defendant could establish that, as an "individual in
an abusive relationship," the complainant "could be expected to protect [the defendant] by
taking blame for the injuries she suffered").
142 See, e.g., Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13 (ruling prior acts were admissible and relevant to
the recanting complainant's credibility because "[v)ictims of domestic abuse are likely to
change their stories out of fear of retribution, or even out of misguided affection").
143 Courts also admit the defendant's prior abusive acts to bolster, explain, or
rehabilitate the credibility of complainants whose credibility has been undermined by
defense cross-examination. See, e.g., State v. Laprade, 958 A.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Vt. 2008)
(allowing evidence of prior abusive acts, noting complainant changed her story about
instant abusive acts).
144 Commonwealth v. Butler, 839 N.E.2d 307, 312-13 (Mass. 2005).
145 Id. at 313.
146 Imwinkelried, supra note 88, at 725. Minnesota, for example, calls this "immediateepisode evidence," and admits prior bad acts under this theory when there is a close causal
and temporal link between the prior act and the charged crime "so that one cannot be fully
shown without proving the other, or where evidence of other crimes constitutes part of the
res gestae." State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009) (citations omitted).
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temporally, or spatially" 147 related to the charged act that they are
"linguistically inseparable" therefrom, 14s courts use the context exception to admit acts of domestic violence that occurred months 149 or
years 150 before the charged incident, and even against intimate partners other than the complainant. 151 In essence, courts conclude that
the prior acts are conceptually inseparable from the charged incident.
Given the presumptively unique nature of domestic violence, jurors
are thought to be unable' to comprehend the charges or the complainant's recantation without knowing that similar acts occurred
before.
Despite courts' assertions to the contrary, evidence of acts of
prior abuse admitted under either rationale permits or requires the
jury to engage in impermissible propensity reasoning. If the "relationship" between the defendant and the complainant has been abusive in
the past, and the jury is instructed that it may consider that abusive
"nature" in ascertaining whether the defendant abused the complainant on the date of the charged incident, it will necessarily apply
propensity reasoning to assess whether he committed the charged
crime. That is precisely what the New Hampshire Supreme Court
recently concluded when it held that evidence of prior acts of abuse
admitted to demonstrate the "context" of a domestic violence relationship is "merely a synonym for propensity." 152
147 Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of
Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 947, 972 (1988).
148 Imwinkelried, supra note 88, at 738-39. In People v. Till, for example, after
observing the defendant commit an armed robbery, a police officer arrested him and
recovered a gun. The defendant was not charged with robbery, but at the ensuing weapon
possession trial the court permitted the officer to testify about the uncharged robbery
because it provided "background information" and demonstrated the "continuity of the
events." 661 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
149 See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998) (admitting acts that occurred in
the month before the charged assault).
150 See, e.g., State v. Sinthavong, No. A12-0853, 2013 WL 1500714, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
2013) (permitting complainant to provide a detailed account of five abusive incidents that
occurred in the three years before the charged crimes and testify about "the general
context of her relationship with [defendant], explaining that he called her names,
controlled when she could see her family, and did not allow her to work" to demonstrate
"the nature and the extent of the relationship" and to assist the jury in determining
"whether [the defendant] committed the acts with which he was charged").
151 In State v. Taylor, for example, the defendant was charged with domestic assault by
strangulation based on allegations that he choked his girlfriend. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals found that the trial court properly admitted, under the state's "relationship
evidence" exception, proof that he had "impeded [the complainant's] breathing on five or
six occasions prior to the charged offense" and evidence that he grabbed a former
girlfriend by the throat ten years earlier. No. A 11-1953, 2012 WL 4475706, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2012).
152 State v. Davidson, 44 A.3d 454, 461 (N.H. 2012) (citation omitted); see also State v.
Melcher, 678 A.2d 146, 150 (N.H. 1996) (finding, in a prosecution for sexual assault, that
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The credibility rationale similarly requires propensity reasoning.
Prior abuse is not directly probative of the complainant's credibility
under traditional impeachment theories. 153 That the complainant may
have been abused in the past has no bearing on her general character
for truthfulness, does not impair her ability to perceive or recall the
charged incident, and does not constitute a prior inconsistent statement. And when the complainant testifies that the charged act did not
occur, but does not claim the relationship has never been violent, 154
prior abusive acts do not contradict the substance of her testimony.
Finally, these prior acts do not logically demonstrate bias in favor of
the defendant; that the complainant had been abused in the past suggests that she would be biased against the defendant, yet in these cases
the prior acts are introduced to show that her exculpatory testimony is
untruthful.
Instead, the jury may link the prior acts to the complainant's
credibility by inferring that, because defendant abused her in the past,
it is likely he committed the charged offense, rendering her present
denial of abuse untruthful. That line of reasoning persuaded the
Washington Court of Appeals to conclude that evidence of prior abusive acts introduced to undermine a recanting complainant's credibility was impermissible propensity evidence in State v. Cook. 155
Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court overruled Cook in State
v. Magers. 156 Acknowledging a trend toward admitting evidence of a
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence under nontraditional theories that are "tied to the characteristics of domestic violence itself,"
the court concluded that "at least insofar as evidence of prior
domestic violence is concerned," prior abusive acts are admissible to
shed light on the credibility of a recanting witness. 157
Finally, in some states, the context exception also incorporates
the same presumption about the psychological impairment of
domestic violence offenders that is reflected in domestic violence propensity statutes. Minnesota and Missouri, for example, allow admisprior bad acts evidence admitted to demonstrate the '"relationship between the parties'
[was] nothing more than the history of the defendant's prior sexual contact with the
victim" and amounted to inadmissible propensity evidence (citations omitted)).
153 Generally, a witness's credibility may be impeached in one of five ways: providing
proof of (1) bias, (2) a "sensory or mental incapacity," (3) "bad character for truth and
veracity," (4) a prior inconsistent statement, or (5) contradicting the substance of her
testimony. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD c. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 6:75 (4th ed. 2013).
154 E.g. State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 197-98 (Haw. 1996); Commonwealth v. Butler, 839
N.E.2d 307, 309 (Mass. 2005).
155 129 P.3d 834, 838 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
156 189 P.3d 126, 133 (Wash. 2008).
157 Id. (citations omitted).
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sion of the defendants' prior acts of abuse against former intimate
partners to demonstrate the "nature of the relationship." 158 As the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned in upholding admission of evidence of abusive acts against the defendant's former girlfriend under
the relationship rationale, "evidence showing how a defendant treats
his family or household members, such as his former spouses or other
girlfriends, sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close
to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with
the victim. " 159
B.

The Medical Treatment and Diagnosis Hearsay Exception

Statements made to medical providers for the purpose of medical
treatment have been exempted from hearsay proscriptions for well
over a century. 160 This reliability-focused hearsay exception161 developed under common law to reflect the belief that individuals are motivated by strong self-interest to speak truthfully to their medical
provider in order to receive accurate medical treatment (the "selfinterest rationale"). 162 When it was codified as Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4), the exception was expanded to reflect a second reliability theory: that "life and death decisions are made by physicians in
reliance on such facts and as such should have sufficient trustworthi-

158 The Minnesota statute extends to admission of acts "against other family or
household members," MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 {West 2015), and includes former
intimate partners. State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 {Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The
Missouri statute admits any "similar" convictions for domestic violence within five years,
regardless of the identity of the complainant. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063 (West 2015).
159 Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
160 See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 259 {1989) (noting that the exception
"has a long history under the common law"). The rule has existed in New York State since
at least 1866. See Matteson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 487, 493 (1866) {holding that
statements of pain and suffering made to examining physicians are not hearsay).
161 The exception is codified federally under FED. R. Evrn. 803, which "proceeds upon
the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available." FED. R. Evrn. 803
advisory committee's note.
162 See Mosteller, supra note 160, at 257 {"The theory of the exception in its archetypal
form is straightforward: a patient's selfish interest in receiving appropriate treatment
guarantees the trustworthiness of the statement."); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
356 (1992) ("[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the
declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries
special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom
testimony.").
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ness to be admissible in a court of law" 163 (the "expert-reliance rationale"). Thus, as codified federally, and adopted verbatim or nearly
verbatim in most states, 164 a statement that is "made for-and is reasonably pertinent to-medical diagnosis or treatment" and "describes
medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause" 165 is exempted from the general hearsay
proscription.
Even as expanded in Federal Rule of Evidence 803( 4), however,
this exception "ordinarily" does not authorize admission of statements
"as to fault," 166 including statements identifying the perpetrator of an
act that prompted the patient to seek medical treatment. 167 The
reason for this exclusion is simple, and consistent with both the selfinterest and expert-reliance rationales: A doctor treating someone
who is seeking treatment for injuries sustained during a physical
assault, for example, will administer the same medical treatment for
the injuries regardless of whether the assailant was a stranger or the
patient's neighbor, boss, or friend. Knowing this, the patient has no
motivation to truthfully identify the assailant, and the doctor does not
rely on this information for any medical purpose, so identity is beyond
the scope of the exception.16s
Despite this well-established limitation, appellate courts in at
least eight states 169 and one federal circuit170 have expanded the med163 United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) (identifying the "twin policy justifications"
underlying FED. R. Evm. 803(4)).
164 See Mosteller, supra note 160, at 257 n.2 (listing twenty-five states that have adopted
FED. R. Evm. 803(4) verbatim or with stylistic variation and seven states that have
adopted modified versions). For further discussion of the history of this exception, see id.
at 261-64.
165 FED. R. Evm. 803(4).
166 FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. To illustrate this point, the drafters
explained that "a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify
(for admission] but not his statement that the car was driven through a red light." Id.
167 See, e.g., Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (finding that statements of identity would
"seldom, if ever" fall within FED. R. Evm. 803(4)).
168 See Renville, 779 F.2d at 436 (discussing why statements of identity generally fall
outside the scope of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception).
169 E.g., Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145, 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Nash v. State,
754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Backlund, No. 240641, 2003 WL
21246619, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2003); State v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231, 238
(N.M. 1995); People v. Ortega, 942 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (N.Y. 2010); Williams v. Alexander,
129 N.E.2d 417, 420 (N.Y. 1955); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111, 120 (Or. 1990) (en bane);
State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957,
962 (Wyo. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000 WL
34601353, at *132 (N. Mar. I. June 28, 2000). While the issue presented in Ortega was
whether a statement in a hospital record fell within the business records hearsay exception,
in the context of hospital records the scope of that exception is coterminous with the
medical treatment and diagnosis exception. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
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ical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception in domestic violence
prosecutions to encompass a patient's identification of the assailant to
medical providers. In these jurisdictions, when an individual seeks
medical treatment following a domestic assault and discloses to the
medical provider that her boyfriend caused her injuries, the provider
may recount at an ensuing trial both that the patient reported that she
had been assaulted and that she identified her boyfriend as the
assailant.
Although the medical treatment and diagnosis exception reflects
reliability principles, in expanding this exception courts do not consider, let alone decide, whether a patient's identification of her
partner as her assailant is more reliable than other identifications. rn
Eschewing the self-interest rationale, courts instead tangentially
invoke the expert-reliance rationale by emphasizing the presumptively
unique medical treatment rendered to those who report domestic violence.172 Starting from the presumption that domestic violence causes
emotional and psychological trauma, they reason that this nonphysical
injury distinguishes domestic violence from other types of violence. 173
They then extrapolate that "a doctor faced with a victim who has been
assaulted by an intimate partner is not only concerned with bandaging
wounds,"17 4 but rather will take actions to treat the nonphysical injuries by providing "information about domestic violence and necessary
social services," 175 advising the patient to leave her abusive partner176
declined to "foreclose the possibility" that it might adopt a "limited categorical rule of
admissibility under the medical exception to hearsay for statements of identification by
victims of domestic violence." State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006).
110 United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he identity of the abuser
is reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case .... ").
171 Interestingly, doing so would raise consistency problems for courts that have
concluded, in other contexts, that domestic violence complainants are more likely to lie
about the cause of their injuries or the identity of their assailant. See supra Part II.A.
172 See, e.g., Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215 ("[Domestic violence] differs materially, both as
an offense and a diagnosis, from other types of assault in its effect on the victim and in the
resulting treatment.").
173 See, e.g., Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494 ("All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional
and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of
the abuser."); accord Moore, 1 So. 3d at 150 (quoting Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95); Nash, 754
N.E.2d at 1025 (same); see also Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16 ("In addition to physical
injuries, a victim of domestic violence may have a whole host of other issues to confront,
including psychological and trauma issues .... "); People v. Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340
(Crim. Ct. 1998) ("Unlike other types of assault, domestic violence results not only in
physical injuries to its frightened and battered victims but also will have a traumatic impact
on the victims' psychological well-being.").
174 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16; see also Joe, 8 F.3d at 1495 ("[T]he physician's
treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim's family or
household.").
175 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16.
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or seek counseling,177 and/or contacting the police. 178 Therefore,
because the revelation of domestic violence causes a medical provider
to treat the nonphysical injuries, the identification of the assailant is
medically relevant and falls within the medical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception. 17 9
Yet there is a significant disconnect between the courts' reasoning
and the evidentiary ruling. The causation of emotional and psychological trauma hardly distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of
assault; all or most acts of violence cause nonphysical injuries. 180 The
true "difference" between domestic violence and other types of
assault that seems to motivate the expansion of this hearsay exception
is not the causation of nonphysical trauma, per se, but rather an
assumption about the impact of such trauma on the patient's ability or
willingness to prevent future harm. Invoking the specter of learned
helplessness, courts imply that patients who report domestic violence
require doctors to intervene and take preventative measures on their
behalf.
The Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Roberts is illustrative. The complainant sought medical treatment at an emergency
room after being assaulted. 181 Though she wanted only to be
"examined, treated, and allowed to leave the hospital" and was
unwilling to discuss what happened to her, the doctor believed her
injuries were the result of domestic violence. 182 The doctor testified
that "such patients are often, because of psychological dependencies,
unable to leave the abusive relationship and unwilling to report the
176 See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1496 ("In the domestic sexual abuse case ... the treating physician
may ... instruct the victim to remove herself from the dangerous environment by leaving
the home and seeking shelter elsewhere."); State v. Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct.
App. 1989) (accepting doctor's testimony that identity was relevant in treating patients
who disclose domestic violence).
177 Joe, 8 F.3d at 1496 ("[T]he treating physician may recommend special therapy or
counseling.").
178 Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000 WL 34601353, at *128 (N.
Mar. I. June 28, 2000); Roberts, 775 P.2d at 343.
179 Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]here injury occurs as
the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial
courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of
the perpetrator.").
180 A brochure published by the Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime,
for example, counsels that all assault victims may experience emotional consequences and
that the assault may cause a "significant immediate and long-term emotional impact."
OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ovc HELP SERIES FOR CRIME
VICTIMS: AssAULT, available at http://www.ovc.gov/pubs/helpseries/pdfs/HelpBrochure_As
sault.pdf.
181 Roberts, 775 P.2d at 343.
182 id.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

432

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:397

abuse," so he "attempts to discover the history of the patient's relationship with the assailant so that, in a proper case, he may advise the
patient to leave the relationship and to seek psychological counseling."183 After the complainant eventually disclosed that her boyfriend had caused her injuries, the doctor called the police, advised
her to "remove herself from the abusive environment," and referred
her to a crisis center for counseling. 184 At the defendant's trial for
second-degree assault, the complainant recanted her allegations of
abuse, but her identification to her doctor of the defendant as her
assailant was admitted as substantive evidence of guilt under the medical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception. 185
The origins of this hearsay expansion substantiate the inference
that courts are concerned primarily with the patient's perceived
inability to prevent future harm. The first jurisdictions to expand the
medical treatment and diagnosis exception to include identification
statements in domestic violence prosecutions drew directly upon decisions that authorized a similar expansion in child abuse prosecutions.186 Explicitly analogizing domestic violence to child abuse, courts
concluded that the same expansion was warranted in domestic violence prosecutions. 187 Yet, these courts glossed over a key distinction
between the two scenarios: A primary justification for expanding the
Id.
Id.
185 Id.
186 See Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) ("[A]n overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions, including at least 32 states and 4 federal circuits, allow into evidence
statements regarding the identity of the perpetrator in child physical or sexual assault
cases."); 2 McCORMICK ON EvrnENCE § 278, at 251 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
("In [child abuse cases], a number of courts have admitted a broad range of statements by
children, including statements identifying a particular individual as the perpetrator of the
offense.").
187 See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993) (analyzing the
expansion of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception in child abuse proceedings and
concluding that, although the complainant was not a child, "the identity of the abuser is
reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case, even
those not involving children"); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000
WL 34601353, at *130 (N. Mar. I. June 28, 2000) (discussing Joe and discerning "no reason
to stray from the sound reasoning of other courts which have refused to apply this
exception solely to children"); State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that, for reasons "similar" to those relied on in child abuse prosecutions, "a
statement attributing fault to an abuser can be reasonably pertinent to treatment in
domestic sexual assault cases involving adults"). See also Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d
145, 149-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (describing how often child abuse cases admit
identifications of perpetrators by abuse victims); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that rationales used in child abuse cases are often similarly
applicable in domestic violence cases); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111, 121 (Or. 1990) (en
bane) ("Admissibility of statements of the type challenged here is not limited to cases
involving child abuse.").
183

184
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scope of "medical treatment" for children is the existence of a legal
mandate that doctors intervene on behalf of minors, who are unable
to make decisions about their aftercare, to prevent them from being
returned to an abusive guardian. 188 Adult domestic violence patients,
by contrast, are legally and developmentally capable of making their
own medical and relationship decisions. 189 The two scenarios simply
are not parallel: Even if the expansion is justified in child abuse prosecutions, it does not follow that the expansion is warranted in domestic
violence prosecutions.
In any event, the actions taken by the doctor upon the disclosure
of domestic violence are not the type of "medical treatment" this
hearsay exception is intended to encompass. In the cases cited above,
the revelation of domestic violence did not cause the doctor to directly
treat the emotional trauma, but rather to refer the patient to social
services, dispense relationship advice, or contact the police. 190 These
actions do not require the kind of specialized medical risk analysis
that renders statements for the purpose of medical treatment and
diagnosis reliable; erroneously informing the patient about available
social services, for example, does not have the same kind of deleterious impact as prescribing the wrong medication or performing an
unnecessary operation. As a normative matter, we may want to
encourage doctors and other medical providers to take these
extramedical steps and act as intermediaries between patients and
social services. Yet, simply because a medical provider-as opposed to
a social worker or a police officer-fills this role does not render it a
"medical" act that carries an imprimatur of reliability.
Thus, in expanding the medical treatment and diagnosis exception to include the identity of the perpetrator in domestic violence
prosecutions, courts conclude neither that domestic violence com188 See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[P]hysicians have
an obligation, imposed by state law, to prevent an abused child from being returned to an
environment in which he or she cannot be adequately protected from recurrent abuse.");
see also 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 278, at 251 n.9 (emphasis added)
("[K]nowledge of the perpetrator is important to the treatment of psychological injuries
that may relate to the identity of the perpetrator and to the removal of the child from the
abuser's custody or control.").
189 There is a growing-and controversial-trend toward the adoption of mandatory
reporting requirements for medical providers who have reason to believe their patients
have experienced domestic violence. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have ls a
Hammer: Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REv.
919, 950 (2011) (describing the "trend toward enacting mandatory reporting of [intimate
partner violence]" that began in California and has sparked controversy). Although, as of
2011, 21 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of mandatory
reporting requirement, id. at 951, only four states had required direct reporting to law
enforcement. Id. at 952.
190 See supra notes 175-79, 181-85 and accompanying text.
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plainants are more likely to speak truthfully to their medical providers
nor that medical providers stake "life and death" medical decisions 191
upon the revelation that the assailant is an intimate partner. 192
Avoiding both of the reliability-focused rationales that motivated the
exception's adoption, they instead invoke prevailing presumptions
about the impact of domestic violence on the complainant's ability or
willingness to end the relationship to justify the departure from this
well-established limit to this hearsay exception. 19 3
The expansion of this hearsay exception is hardly inconsequential, particularly for prosecutions in which the complainant declines to
testify. 1 9 4 Dicta in Giles v. California imply that statements to medical
providers are firmly beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 195
Therefore, prosecutors can comfortably use this exception to fill evidentiary gaps created by the complainant's absence by introducing her
prior accusation against the defendant through the sterilized testimony of a medical professional.
C.

Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

Under the longstanding doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 196 a
defendant forfeits his right to prevent, on hearsay and Confrontation
Clause grounds, the admission of statements from unavailable declarUnited States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145, 149-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (ruling
the identity of a domestic abuser relevant to medical treatment so that the medical
provider can advise the patient to leave the abuser and seek shelter elsewhere); State v.
Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (deeming identity of domestic abuser
relevant to medical treatment because domestic violence renders patients "unable to leave
the abusive relationship and unwilling to report the abuse").
194 When the complainant testifies at trial that the defendant assaulted her, the
introduction of her prior identification to her medical provider will corroborate her incourt testimony, but may add little to the overall weight of the evidence.
195 See 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) ("[O]nly testimonial statements are excluded by the
Confrontation Clause .... [S]tatements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment
would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules .... ").
196 The doctrine was used as early as 1666 in Lord Morley's Case. James F. Flanagan,
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach
Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51
DRAKE L. REv. 459, 462 (2003) ("As early as 1666, English law recognized that an absent
witness's deposition could be admitted in lieu of live testimony if the witness was
unavailable because a party procured the absence .... ").The Supreme Court first applied
the forfeiture doctrine in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), holding that the
statements' admission "did not violate the right of the defendant to confront witnesses at
trial, because when a witness is absent by the defendant's 'wrongful procurement' the
defendant 'is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated' if
'their evidence is supplied in some lawful way."' Giles, 554 U.S. at 366 (quoting Reynolds,
98 U.S. at 158)).
191
192
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ants whose absence that defendant "obtain[ed] ... by wrongdoing." 197
Unlike most hearsay exceptions, the forfeiture doctrine is not a "surrogate" for the statement's reliability. 198 Rather, it is an equitable
principle that prevents one who procures a witness's absence by
wrongful means from benefiting from that wrong. 199 In other words, a
defendant who wrongfully renders a witness unavailable to testifythrough coercion, intimidation, chicanery, homicide, or other nefarious means-cannot reap the benefit of that wrongful action at trial
by preventing admission of that witness's hearsay statements. 200
Given the frequency with which domestic violence complainants
decline to testify at trial, 201 many have identified the forfeiture doctrine as crucial to prosecution's ability to proceed in the complainant's
absence, particularly after Crawford v. Washington. 202 Equity, however, is "a two-way street";203 while the forfeiture doctrine protects
the integrity of the court from wrongful defendant-induced evidenDavis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
199 Id.
200 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (ruling that one who "wrongful[ly] procure[s]" the
absence of a witness "cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the
place of that which he has kept away" and "cannot insist on" the constitutional privilege of
being "confronted with the witnesses against him"). Because one loses his or her right to
invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules only through actions
intended to interfere with the truth-seeking process of the criminal justice system, see
Flanagan, supra note 196, at 482-84 (describing the intent requirement used by courts in
invoking the misconduct exception), some courts and commentators have aptly
characterized the doctrine as based on waiver principles instead of forfeiture. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (referring to "waiver by
misconduct"); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), superseded
by rule on other grounds, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v.
Nelson, 242 F. App'x 164, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[A] defendant who causes a witness to
be unavailable for trial for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying also
waives his right to confrontation .... "); Flanagan, supra note 196, at 483 ("Nothing in
these opinions suggests that either the federal or state courts were establishing the broader
principle that responsibility for the witness's absence, regardless of intent, would be a
waiver of constitutional and evidentiary rights.").
201 See, e.g., De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 367-68 ("[V]ictims of domestic violence are
uncooperative [with the prosecution] in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases.");
Lininger, supra note 16, at 768 ("Recent evidence suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered
women will recant at some point.").
202 See, e.g., Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 449 (2006) (arguing that
forfeiture by wrongdoing "may present an opportunity for domestic violence prosecutors
to combat domestic violence under the worst of circumstances: namely, when the victim is
unable to participate in the prosecution"); Lininger, supra note 16, at 807-08
(recommending universal codification of a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception to
"diminish the detrimental effect of Crawford on prosecutions of domestic violence").
203 James F. Flanagan, We Have a "Purpose" Requirement if We Can Keep It, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 553, 575 (2009).
197

198
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tiary gaps,204 it also prevents criminal defendants from being stripped
of essential evidentiary and constitutional protections upon a mere
allegation they committed any wrongful act in the past. Forfeiture of
essential constitutional and evidentiary protections is an equitable
response only if the defendant intentionally prevents the declarant
from cooperating with a court proceeding. 205 Therefore, the doctrine,
as developed in common law, codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence206 and state evidence codes,207 and recently clarified in Giles
v. California, requires three criteria: that the defendant (1) engaged in
wrongful conduct (2) for the purpose of preventing a witness from
testifying that (3) caused the witness's unavailability.
Scholars have thoroughly examined the connection between the
first two elements in domestic violence prosecutions, especially in
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington and

204 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (suggesting the forfeiture doctrine
is appropriate when defendants "undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing
silence from witnesses and victims" or otherwise act "in ways that destroy the integrity of
the criminal-trial system"). The doctrine was codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence to
provide "a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of
the system of justice itself."' FED. R. Evm. 804 advisory committee's note (quoting
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273).
205 Joan Comparet-Cassani, Crawford and the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Exception, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1185, 1207 (2005) (discussing the "law of equity" and concluding that,
"without the presence of that intent [to prevent the witness from testifying] there is no
legal justification for the equitable reprimand" embodied in the forfeiture doctrine).
206 FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) authorizes admission of a "statement offered against a party
that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causing-the declarant's
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result." FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6)
(emphasis added). This rule "codifies the forfeiture doctrine." Davis, 547 U.S. at 833. As
developed under common law, the same forfeiture standards apply to both constitutional
and evidentiary forfeiture. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("More commonly ... courts have taken the view ... that misconduct leading to the loss of
confrontation rights also necessarily causes the defendant to forfeit hearsay objections."
(citation omitted)). The majority opinion in Giles, however, stressed that states may adopt
a less demanding standard for evidentiary forfeiture. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376
(2008).
207 At least 18 states have codified this hearsay exception. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1350
(West 1995 & Supp. 2015); GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-8-804(b)(5) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., Crs.
& Jun. PRoc. § 10-901(LexisNexis2013 & Supp. 2014); DEL R. Evm. 804(b)(6); HAw. R.
Evm. 804(b)(7); IND. R. Evm. 804(b)(5); Iowa R. Evm. 5.804(b)(6); KY. R. Evm.
804(b)(5); MASS. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); MICH. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); N.J. R. Evm. 804(b)(9);
N.M. R. Evm. 11-804(B)(5); N.D. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); OHIO R. Evm. 804(B)(6); OR. R.
Evm. 804(3)(f); PA. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); TENN. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); VT. R. Evm. 804(b)(6).
New York, which lacks codified rules of evidence, also recognizes this exception. People v.
Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 820-21 (N.Y. 1995). For an overview of the slight variances
between the state statutes, see Giles, 554 U.S. at 367-68 n.2. Despite the variations, states
"use the general principles found in the federal cases ...." Flanagan, supra note 196, at
470.
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Giles v. California. 208 Instead of repeating those analyses, this section
will briefly recount the developments of Giles before focusing on an
area that has received less attention: the nexus between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the causation element.
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed criminal defendants the opportunity to
cross-examine declarants of testimonial statements. 209 By reinvigorating a defendant's right to an in-court confrontation with his
accuser, Crawford cast doubt on the continued viability of tactics that
had been developed to enable prosecution of domestic violence
crimes without the complainant's participation. 210
In response, scholars and prosecutors demanded a more permissive forfeiture standard that reflected the need for hearsay evidence in
domestic violence prosecutions. 211 Reasoning that Crawford permitted-and even compelled-the expansion of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception beyond deliberate witness tampering, 212 courts
began finding forfeiture in domestic homicide prosecutions without
208 E.g., Flanagan, supra note 203, at 553 ("[T]he purpose requirement of Giles, and
ultimately Crawford's protection of the Confrontation Clause, will be undermined unless
the courts require strict 'but for' proof of the reason for the witness's absence, including
proof that the witness did not have independent personal reasons for avoiding testifying.");
Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEx. L. REv. 857, 874-75 (2009) ("The most controversial topic in Giles was
the notion that domestic violence, by its very nature, might amount to wrongful conduct
sufficient to forfeit confrontation rights.... [A] majority of the Court apparently endorsed
the notion of 'inferred intent' whereby a long-term abusive relationship might support a
finding of forfeiture."); Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture in
Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 1329, 1345--47 (2010) (discussing the roles of
"inferred intent" stemming from misconduct in domestic violence cases).
209 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
210 Under these "evidence-based" or "victimless" prosecution tactics, police were
required to respond "differently and more thoroughly" to domestic violence cases than
they would other acts of violence by collecting physical evidence and statements from
complainants immediately following the reported abuse. GoooMARK, supra note 5, at
110-11. Prosecutors would rely on this evidence, in combination with medical records and
911 calls, to pursue charges even if the complainant declined to testify at trial. Id.
211 See, e.g., King-Ries, supra note 202, at 460--61 (identifying the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine as a "solution to Crawford" that permits the continued viability of
"victimless prosecutions"); Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It ls Not
Stupid": Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR,
Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14, 15-16 (identifying "forfeiture by domestic violence" as a "long-term
solution" to the obstacles to evidence-based prosecution after Crawford).
212 See, e.g., People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 443--44 (Cal. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. 353
(2008) (acknowledging that the forfeiture doctrine generally applied to deliberate witness
tampering, but concluding that after Crawford, courts should admit "relevant evidence that
the defendant caused not to be available through live testimony," even if the defendant did
not intend to cause the declarant's unavailability as a witness); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d
518, 535 (Wis. 2007) ("[W]e believe that in a post-Crawford world [a] broad view of
forfeiture by wrongdoing ... is essential.").
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any proof that the defendant killed the decedent to prevent her from
testifying or cooperating with the authorities. 213 A six-justice majority
of the Supreme Court put a halt to this practice in Giles v. California,
ruling that a defendant forfeits his confrontation right only if he commits a wrongful act for the purpose of procuring her absence as a
witness. 214
Ultimately the Giles decision, which was comprised of five opinions,21s "left open more questions than it answered," 216 one of which
is worth highlighting here. Though the majority purportedly rejected
calls for a "special" forfeiture standard that exempted domestic violence from the intent requirement, 217 the question remains whether, in
fact, the intent requirement carries a different meaning in domestic
violence prosecutions. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
wrote in his concurring opinion that the requisite intent to forfeit
could be "inferred" from a "classic abusive relationship, which is
meant to isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of law
enforcement and the judicial process." 218 Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Stevens and Kennedy in his dissent, agreed with this passage,
which he interpreted as a conclusion that proof of past domestic abuse
is "sufficient" for a finding of forfeiture in a domestic homicide prosecution.219 Thus, it seems this five-justice "majority"220 in fact supports
the adoption of a "special, improvised" 221 intent standard for domestic
violence prosecutions under which a defendant who abuses a complainant prospectively forfeits his future confrontation and hearsay
objections to the admission of her statements in a future legal
proceeding. 222
213 E.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963, 966-69 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Giles, 152 P.3d at 443-44;
Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 521, 534-36 (embracing the Garcia-Meza court's view on intent in
applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine).
214 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354, 359-62 (2008). The Court clarified that the
only "wrong" from which the doctrine prevented a defendant from benefitting was
"conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying." Id. at 359.
215 Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in full,
and Justices Souter and Ginsberg joined in part. Id. at 354. Justices Thomas and Alito filed
concurring opinions. Id. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in part. Id. Justice
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined. Id.
216 Raeder, supra note 208, at 1332.
217 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376-77.
218 Id. at 379-80 (Souter, J., concurring).
219 Id. at 380, 404-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220 This refers to Justices Souter and Ginsburg in concurrence and Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Kennedy in dissent.
221 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
222 For further discussion of this "inferred intent" standard, see Raeder, supra note 208,
at 1343-47; Lininger, supra note 208, at 874-75.
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Under this "majority" standard, forfeiture may be an equitable
response to abusive acts that occurred well before any criminal proceeding was underway. Furthermore, states remain "free to adopt"
less stringent forfeiture standards for the admission of hearsay. 223 In
this era of the "[i]ncredible [s]hrinking Confrontation Clause,"224 evidence rules may have an increasingly greater impact on the adjudication of guilt than Sixth Amendment confrontation restrictions.
An area that has garnered less attention is one that the Court did
not have to address in Giles: the requisite nexus between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the declarant's unavailability as a witness.225 When a witness does not appear in court, and the prosecution
can establish that the defendant has engaged in threatening or other
coercive behaviors, establishing causation is rather straightforward. A
more challenging inquiry arises with some frequency226 in nonhomicide domestic violence prosecutions: A complainant will be present in
court, but refuse to testify for the prosecution, invoke a privilege,
and/or claim to not remember the substance of her requested testimony, and deny that the defendant threatened her or otherwise
caused her "unavailability" as a witness. 227
Of course, a witness's insistence that she has not been intimidated
into unavailability is not the last word on causation; "in a case
involving coercion or threats, a witness who refuses to testify at trial
will not testify to the actions procuring his or her unavailability." 22 8
Thus, courts routinely examine the circumstances surrounding the
unavailability to determine causation. 229
Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1865,
1865, 1867-68 (2012) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence restricting the scope of
the Confrontation Clause after Crawford v. Washington).
225 In Giles it was uncontested that the defendant caused the witness's death and,
consequently, her unavailability as a witness. See 554 U.S. at 356 (describing the events of
the witness's death and defendant's testimony confirming responsibility, but claiming selfdefense ).
226 See supra note 201 (describing the frequency with which domestic violence
complaining witnesses decline to testify at trial).
227 A witness may be "unavailable" for forfeiture purposes even if she is present but
refuses to testify, invokes a privilege, or testifies she cannot remember the subject matter
of her requested testimony. See FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (defining "unavailability").
228 United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002); see also People v. Geraci,
649 N.E.2d 817, 823 (N.Y. 1995) ("[G]iven the inherently surreptitious nature of witness
tampering," the party seeking a forfeiture finding "will often have nothing more to rely
upon than circumstantial proof.").
229 In United States v. Scott, for example, an uncooperative witness did not testify at the
forfeiture hearing, so the court examined the circumstances in which the witness became
"unavailable" to determine whether the defendant had forfeited his right to object to the
admission of the witness's grand jury testimony. Based on testimony from a third party that
the defendant had told the witness to "keep his mouth shut" and that the witness seemed
223

224
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There is a growing consensus that there are many reasons that a
domestic violence complainant will become "unavailable" as a witness, including love, financial reliance, immigration concerns, a desire
to keep their family intact, and threats or coercion that lead to fear of
reprisal. 230 Only one of these reasons-fear induced by defendant's
threats or coercion-should result in imposition of the "equitable"
remedy of forfeiture. Indeed, it is hardly fair to apply the doctrine
"when it does not appear that the witness was absent by the suggestion, connivance, or procurement of the accused .... " 231 Nevertheless,
in a few jurisdictions, even when complainants offer reasons for
refusing to testify that are not attributable to the defendant's wrongful
conduct, courts draw on prevailing stereotypes about domestic violence to find that, in fact, the defendant caused her unavailability. 232
In essence, these courts conclude that a different "equitable" equation
applies in domestic violence prosecutions: If the defendant has abused
the complainant in the past it is fair to infer that he caused her to
absent herself as a witness-even if she says otherwise. While this
practice is currently limited to only a few jurisdictions, commentators
"nervous and scared," the court found forfeiture. 284 F.3d at 762-64. And in People v.
Geraci, the court found that the defendant had caused the witness's unavailability for
forfeiture purposes, despite the witness's denial that the defendant had threatened him,
based on the witness's previous statements to officers that he feared reprisal from the
defendant and that the defendant had paid him to refrain from testifying. 649 N.E.2d at
819-20, 823-24.
230 E.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 52 ("Legal intervention may provide women
certain protection from battering, but it does not provide women housing, support, child
care, employment, community acceptance, or Jove. It also does not deal with the economic
realities of life."); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1232
(1993) (identifying contextual factors that may influence a battered woman as "fear of
retaliation," available "economic (and other tangible) resources," "concern for her
children," "emotional attachment to her partner," "personal emotional strengths, such as
hope or optimism," "race, ethnicity, and culture," "emotional, mental, and physical
vulnerabilities," and "perception of the availability of social support"); Miccio, supra note
57, at 307 ("If we listen to women survivors, we learn that they stay [with their abusers] for
myriad reasons-fear of reprisal, fear of losing their children, economic concerns,
emotional ties to the batterer or his family, lack of social or familial support, and lack of a
place to go.").
231 Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
232 For example, in United States v. Montague, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court
that found that the defendant caused the unavailability of his wife, who refused to testify
against him and invoked marital privilege, based on evidence that he abused her in the past
and had contact with her before trial-when she went to visit him in prison. 421 F.3d 1099,
1101, 1103-04 (10th Cir. 2005); see also People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509-10 (App.
Div. 2008) (relying on expert testimony that the complainant was a battered woman to
reject the complainant's testimony that she was not testifying for reasons not attributable
to the defendant's conduct); People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176, at *2,
*11-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003) (same).
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have suggested that it may233 or should234 be used more frequently,
especially after Giles.
A handful of decisions emerging from New York State domestic
violence prosecutions highlight the troubling implications of this specialized causation standard. In People v. Santiago, the defendant was
arrested for violating an order of protection against his girlfriend. 235
The complainant reluctantly testified before the grand jury, but soon
thereafter left messages for the prosecutor explaining that life as a
"single parent" was "very hard" and that she could not work full time
because no one else was available to watch her daughter (presumably
because the defendant was in jail), and asking that the prosecutor
drop the charges. 236 When the complainant declined to testify at trial,
the prosecution argued the defendant had forfeited his right to object
to the admission of her inculpatory grand jury testimony. 237
At an extensive forfeiture hearing, the complainant testified that
she loved the defendant, had falsified accusations against him in the
past out of jealousy, and had acted violently towards him on occasion.238 The prosecution called an expert witness who testified that
this was a "classic example of a domestic violence relationship" and
that the complainant was an "abused woman whose current behavior
is explained by Battered Women's Syndrome." 239 She opined that the
complainant's behavior reflected an "imposed lack of self esteem" and
"level of desperation" that "can only be attributed to the coercion
inherent in the honeymoon phase of the cycle of violence" and the
"tremendous pressure" the defendant placed on her. 240
The court admitted that, in "other kinds of cases" it would
"take[ ] for granted that a complainant's desire to withdraw from the
prosecution" was not attributable to the defendant.2 41 Yet, it reasoned, domestic violence cases "are to be viewed differently from
other crimes of violence which come through our courts. " 242 The court
233 See Flanagan, supra note 203, at 573-76 (offering "cautionary thoughts" on
establishing causation after Giles).
234 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of "Domestic
Violence Context," 13 LEw1s & CLARK L. REv. 711, 726 (2009) ("With respect to both
mens rea and causation, then, Giles represents an invitation to prosecutors to make salient
the full spectrum of abuse that resulted in a live victim's absence from trial.").
235 2003 WL 21507176, at *l.
236 Id. at *9-10. The complainant also visited the defendant ten times in jail, and the
defendant called her more than 100 times. Id. at *11.
237 Id. at *l.
238 Id. at *2, *4.
239 Id. at *12.
240 Id.
241 Id. at *14.
242 Id. at *15.
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contrasted complainants in "the vast majority of cases," who will
"follow through [with the prosecution] because they have the
strength, the will and the need to do so," with domestic violence complainants, who "lack the self esteem and strength to seek retribution
or permanent safety from their attackers." 243 It concluded a domestic
violence complainant's "attempts to become unavailable as a prosecuting witness cannot be viewed as ... voluntary," 244 and that the
defendant had caused the complainant's refusal to testify by using her
"desires for a normal and loving relationship to his own end." 245
Therefore, it ruled that the defendant had forfeited his right to objection to the admission of her inculpatory grand jury testimony.2 46
A similar fact pattern unfolded in People v. Byrd, and to the
same effect. 247 While the allegations against the defendant were more
troubling than in Santiago, 248 the complainant's assertion that he did
not cause her unavailability was even more adamant. At the forfeiture
hearing, she "maintained that her refusal to testify was a product of
her free choice, that she wanted to forgive defendant and that she
believed he needed treatment rather than incarceration." 249 She
denied that the defendant had asked her to refrain from testifying,
and stated that she initially cooperated with the prosecution "out of
fear that the Administration for Child Services would take her child
from her." 250 She also wrote a letter to the court indicating she did not
want the defendant to remain in jail, expressing confidence that he
could change if given the chance to do so, and conveying sadness that
their daughter would spend another holiday season without him. 251
The prosecution presented the same expert witness who had testified in Santiago, 252 and the expert again recounted the cycle of violence theory and concluded that the defendant and complainant's
Id.
Id.
245 Id. at *13. This conclusion is all the more notable since New York applies the
demanding clear and convincing evidence standard to forfeiture rulings. Flanagan, supra
note 196, at 469. Most states apply a less demanding preponderance standard. See id. at 477
("Following the majority of courts the [advisory committee for the Federal Rules of
Evidence] concluded that the proponent's burden of proof was the preponderance of the
evidence.").
246 2003 WL 21507176, at *16.
247 855 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507, 509-10 (App. Div. 2008).
248 Byrd was charged with attempting to murder the complainant based on allegations
that he brutally assaulted the complainant and then prevented her from seeking medical
care for six days. Id. at 507.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 509.
252 The expert in both cases was Professor Ann Burgess. Id. at 508; People v. Santiago,
No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003).
243

244
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relationship fit this "typical pattern." 253 Although the expert had
never met the complainant, 254 she concluded that the complainant was
"in a coercive controlled relationship with the defendant," that he
could control her "without engaging in any conduct whatsoever," 255
and that such control caused the complainant to "lie under oath to
protect him." 256 Crediting the expert's testimony over the complainant's, the court concluded that the defendant had caused the
complainant's unavailability as a witness. The state appellate court
upheld this decision on appeal, 257 as did the Southern District of New
York in reviewing defendant's habeas petition. 25 8
These decisions demonstrate a willingness, even in the absence of
evidence of direct or implied threats connected to the complainant's
impending testimony, and even when the complainant herself testifies
that she is refusing to inculpate the defendant of her own free will, to
infer from proof of past abuse that the defendant caused the witness's
unavailability. The complainants in both cases offered alternative and
reasonable reasons for refusing to support the prosecution: love, the
desire to keep the family intact, and the practical daily need for the
defendant's assistance. 259 Nevertheless, these courts seem to conclude
that when a complainant has been abused, fear of reprisal is the only
reason she could refuse to cooperate with the prosecution.
An even more recent New York State forfeiture decision in
People v. Copney underscores this myopic interpretation of causation.260 There, the trial court invoked the tort doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to conclude that a "complainant would not ordinarily stop
People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
Byrd v. Brown, No. 09 CIV. 5755(GBD)(JCF), 2010 WL 6764702, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2010), adopted by No. 09 CIV. 5755(GBD)(JCF), 2011 WL 2162140 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2011).
255 Id.
256 People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
257 Id. at 510.
258 Byrd v. Brown, 2011 WL 2162140.
259 See supra note 230 and accompanying text (outlining reasons complainants might
refuse to cooperate). And the Byrd court refused to engage the complainant's claim that
she had been coerced not by defendant, but rather by the Administration of Children's
Services, through threats to take her children from her. People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at
510. Yet, this threat was credible and verifiable: The incident at issue in Byrd occurred in
2002. Until the 2004 settlement in Nicholson v. Scoppetta, New York State Administration
for Children's Services routinely removed children from the care of mothers who were
abused by their partners. See Kathleen A. Copps, The Good, the Bad, and the Future of
Nicholson v. Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further
Improvements, 72 ALB. L. REv. 497, 503-09 (2009) (discussing ACS practices and New
York State law leading up to and following the settlement in Nicholson v. Scoppetta). For
an explanation of the complex procedural history of that case, see Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
820 N.E.2d 840, 842-43 (N.Y. 2004).
260 969 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
253

254
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cooperating with the district attorney but for the agency of the defendant's [phone] calls [from prison] in which she did not voluntarily act
or contribute." 2 6 1 Therefore, despite conflicting evidence as to
whether the defendant's phone calls caused the complainant's unavailability, the court concluded it was "clear that the wrongful calls of the
defendant, aimed and intended to silence the witness, made and
caused her to be unavailable to the People. " 262 In other words, the
domestic violence "speaks for itself" and it can convey only one story,
regardless of what the complainant says.
III
THE IMPACT OF EvmENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ExcEPTIONALISM

Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer and others have critiqued the
use of traditional evidence rules in domestic violence prosecutions for
"mut[ing] stories of battering" and evidentiary doctrine for
"unmoor[ing]" domestic violence from its context. 263 Yet, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, in many jurisdictions, it is evidentiary
doctrine that is "unmoored" from its underlying principles to reflect
prevailing presumptions about domestic violence; courts and legislatures justify the adaptation of fairness-based rules by appealing to reliability principles (as in domestic violence propensity exceptions), or
by redefining what is "equitable" in the context of domestic violence
(as in the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception), and/or by eschewing
engagement with underlying reliability principles altogether (as in the
medical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception).
This evidentiary unmooring is hardly inconsequential. Evidence
introduced under these specialized rules can be so persuasive it may
be dispositive. For example, empirical studies confirm that exposure
to uncharged misconduct evidence "greatly increases the likelihood of
a guilty verdict. " 2 6 4 It is unsurprising, therefore, that prosecutors in
jurisdictions with domestic violence propensity statutes reported that
the statutes are "invaluable" in obtaining guilty pleas and verdicts 2 6 5
and "greatly strengthened [their] ability to prove their domestic vioId. at 900.
Id.
263 Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 990.
264 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM. JusT. 16,
21 (1992).
265 See Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence for
Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1115, 1138, 1148 (citing to survey responses from prosecutors in Minnesota and California).
261

262
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lence cases beyond a reasonable doubt." 266 The case law supports this
observation. In the Alaska case of Carter v. State, for example, the
defendant was charged with fourth-degree assault based on allegations that he punched his wife. 267 Through the application of the
state's domestic violence propensity statute, the jury learned that he
had assaulted her nine years before the charged incident and again
five years before the charged incident. 268 Acknowledging that the
state's case against the defendant was otherwise weak, the Alaska
Court of Appeals upheld admission of this evidence under the state's
domestic violence propensity statute. 2 6 9
Similarly, the addition of the domestic violence context exception
to an already malleable list of purportedly nonpropensity theories of
admissibility for past bad acts can be immensely helpful to the prosecution. Generally, noncharacter theories of admissibility, such as
motive or intent, depend on the theory of defense and therefore
permit introduction of prior bad acts evidence only in rebuttal or if
the defense "opens the door" to such evidence. 270 Evidence of prior
bad acts that is probative of the "domestic violence context," by contrast, is generally admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, regardless of the theory of the defense. Moreover, studies substantiate that
jurors use prior acts evidence admitted for a nonpropensity purpose
for propensity reasoning, despite limiting instructions prohibiting
them from doing so. 271 The "nai"ve assumption" that limiting instructions could overcome these prejudicial effects is an "unmitigated fiction. " 272 Thus, by increasing the frequency with which prior bad acts
are admitted in domestic violence prosecutions, the domestic violence
context exception inevitably increases the frequency with which juries
convict domestic violence defendants based on propensity reasoning.
The specialization of the hearsay-related rules is also a substantial
boon for prosecutors. Since statements that fall within the medical
treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception are considered presumptively reliable, statements of identification made by a patient who
Id. at 1143.
No. A-10677, 2011WL3667222, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2011).
268 Id. at *1-2.
269 Id. at *3.
270 Generally, a defendant may "take an issue ... out of a case" and, therefore, render
the nonpropensity prior acts evidence irrelevant. United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414,
1421-22 (2d Cir. 1993). In the Second Circuit, for example, a defendant may remove the
issue of intent from a case by asserting that he did not commit a crime, as opposed to
conceding that he did so, but innocently or mistakenly. Id.
271 Imwinkelried, supra note 264, at 21.
272 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ("The naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, ... all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction." (citation omitted)).
266
267
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reports domestic violence to her doctor are admissible even if she
does not testify at trial, 273 or if she testifies but recants her identification.274 Moreover, dicta in Giles v. California strongly suggest that
statements to medical providers are not testimonial and, therefore, a
Confrontation Clause objection to such testimony would be futile. 275
This specialized exception, therefore, allows prosecutors to avoid
calling a reluctant complainant altogether; instead, they can simply
call the treating physician to recount her identification. On the other
hand, since the forfeiture doctrine is based on principles of equity,
rather than reliability, establishing forfeiture permits introduction of
evidence that is patently unreliable, yet highly persuasive.
IV
THE HARMS OF EvrnENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ExcEPTIONALISM

Although the overriding purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the truth about an alleged criminal act, 276 every criminal defen- '
dant is guaranteed a number of protections that preclude the
collection or introduction of evidence many consider essential to the
truth-seeking process. 277 While the criminal justice system undoubtedly values truthseeking, it also values fairness in addition to, and
sometimes at the expense of, ascertaining truth. 278 Thus, a criminal
trial is properly understood not as a search for the absolute truth of an
273 See, e.g., Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 960, 962 (Wyo. 2000) (admitting
nontestifying patient's report to her doctor).
274 See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (admitting report to
doctor of patient who recanted).
275 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) ("[O]nly testimonial statements are
excluded by the Confrontation Clause.... [S]tatements to physicians in the course of
receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules.").
276 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (explaining "the very nature of a trial as a
search for truth").
277 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that, although the
"basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth," the "Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," but nonetheless
demands "undiluted respect"); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948)
("The overriding policy of excluding [character] evidence, despite its admitted probative
value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues,
unfair surprise and undue prejudice.").
278 Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060,
1063-64 (1975) ("We are concerned, however, with far more than a search for truth, and
the constitutional rights ... serve independent values that may well outweigh the truthseeking value, a fact made manifest when we realize that those rights, far from furthering
the search for truth, may well impede it."). Of course this proposition is not without its
critics. See Kenneth W. Starr, Speech, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 TEx. TECH L. REv. 901,
902-03 (1999) (summarizing debate between Alan Dershowitz and Akhil Reed Amar
about whether truthseeking should be the goal of the criminal justice system).
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event, but rather a search for a mitigated "courtroom truth," 279 a process whereby a fact finder determines whether the state established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged
crime, through procedures and proof deemed fair-and just without
regard for the nature of the underlying substantive allegations. 280
Evidence rules are crucial to the construction of this courtroom truth.
They are "historically grounded rights" that protect the reasonable
doubt standard and safeguard defendants "from dubious and unjust
convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property. " 281
As demonstrated in Part II, however, many jurisdictions have
manipulated evidence rules to shape the courtroom truth in domestic
violence prosecutions to comport with the prevailing preconceptions
about the dynamics of domestic violence. Rejecting transsubstantive
evidence rules and standards, courts and legislatures reason that
domestic violence is different and that this difference requires specialized evidence rules and standards. Although these are persuasive and
effective weapons in the criminal justice-focused war against domestic
violence, even when these tactics work, they nevertheless cause
harm. 282
A.

Legitimacy and Fairness Harms

As recounted above, the dominance feminist account of domestic
violence exceptionalism shapes evidentiary doctrine in many jurisdictions. And, as will be discussed below, this account, both generally,
and in its specific application to evidentiary doctrine, is detrimental to
many complainants. But its employment to shape evidentiary doctrine
279 John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation
or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 238 (1935) ("Courtroom truth is what a jury or the
judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.").
280 See Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 465,
468-69 (1998) (arguing the fusion of a variety of criminal justice system elements,
"including evidentiary and procedural rules," achieves "a 'legal' truth that ultimately meets
our current social expectations of 'fundamental fairness' or 'justice'" (citations omitted)).
In New York State, parties and courts are prohibited from instructing a criminal jury that
the trial is a "search for the truth," since doing so suggests the jury may convict if it
concludes the verdict represents the "truth," even if the prosecution has not established
proof thereof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Ward, 966 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (App.
Div. 2013) (concluding that "the prosecutor's characterization of the trial as a 'search for
the truth' was indeed improper," though not finding a deprivation of a fair trial); People v.
Jackson, 571 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that prosecutor's comment that
"a trial is 'the search for the truth'" impaired defendant's right to a fair trial).
281 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
282 See Capers, supra note 24, at 832 ("When rape shields do work, they do so at
extraordinary cost, reinscribing the very chastity requirement that they were intended to
abolish.").
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also has troubling consequences for the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and individual defendants that have heretofore escaped
critical analysis.
As a preliminary matter, the assumptions about domestic violence that fuel the evidentiary manipulation recounted in Part II,
namely that domestic violence occurs according to a universal pattern
and is inflicted on a person who is unable, because of the abuse, to
leave the relationship, are empirically unfounded. This narrative emanates from psychological studies conducted by Lenore Walker, whose
work has been roundly critiqued as methodologically flawed. 283 For
example, the data set upon which Walker based her cycle of violence
theory consisted of the stories of 120 battered women, "fragments" of
other stories, and interviews of people who "offered their services to
battered women." 284 Walker used no control group to test her cycle of
violence hypotheses, employed flawed interview tactics to gather her
data, and, most troublingly, drew conclusions unsupported by her own
data; only approximately thirty-eight percent of the women she interviewed actually experienced all three of the phases that the study
identified and from which Walker drew the "cycle of violence"
theory. 285
The learned helplessness theory stands on even shakier methodological footing. 286 The theory was originally developed by psychologist Martin Seligman to explain why dogs repeatedly subjected to
electrical shocks in a laboratory experiment remained in their cages,
even when they were permitted egress. 287 Applying this theory to battered women, Walker concluded that they did not leave their abusive
relationships because, like the dogs in Seligman's study, they believed
resistance was futile. 288 Yet, in drawing this comparison, Walker overlooked a glaring mismatch between this theory and her data: Many of
the women she interviewed did not express helplessness, but rather
felt that they were in control of what happened to them; many
See GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 61 (summarizing critiques of Walker's studies).
WALKER, supra note 42, at xiii.
David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 77-78 (1997) (identifying five methodological flaws in the
study upon which Lenore Walker built the cycle of violence theory and explaining how
they came to the thirty-eight percent figure).
286 See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 81-83 (1994)
(critiquing Walker's application of learned helplessness to battered women); Myrna S.
Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and
Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 789, 798
(1996) (noting "general agreement that learned helplessness has its limitations," and
discussing alternative research finding that complainants can and do seek help).
287 See WALKER, supra note 42, at 45-46 (describing Seligman's experiment).
288 Id. at 46-50.
283
284
285
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reported that they "analyze what is necessary to control the batterers'
behavior, develop a plan-which may include leaving the battererand attempt to carry it out," even if they are not successful. 2 89
Because of its obfuscation of women's strategic resistance to violence,
learned helplessness and battered woman syndrome have been thoroughly critiqued as disempowering complainants by "emphasiz[ing]
the disabling effects of violence rather than women's survival
skills." 290 Moreover, the concept of learned helplessness is fundamentally incompatible with the question it purported to answer: why some
battered women respond violently to their abusers-the antithesis of a
learned helplessness response-instead of ending the relationship.
The point to be drawn from these critiques is not that domestic
violence never comports with prevailing stereotypes; undoubtedly, the
experiences of some people who experience domestic violence comport with this narrative, even though it has not been rigorously empirically validated. 291 The point, rather, is that not all, and possibly not
even most, domestic violence occurs according to an escalating pattern that renders the complainant unwilling and unable to respond.
Once it is acknowledged that the cycle of violence and learned
helplessness theories do not embody an accurate, universalized
description of domestic violence, the most explicit justifications for
why domestic violence offenses require specialized rules fall away.
What remains is the need-based justification, namely, that specialized
and more permissive evidence rules are necessary because domestic
violence offenses are notoriously difficult to prosecute. The specialized rules, therefore, are an attempt to compensate for the difficulty of
proving and punishing allegations of domestic violence. But manipulating evidence rules to circumvent evidentiary difficulties in proving
guilt represents an aberration in an adjudicatory system that purports
to also uphold values beyond the simple ascertainment of truth, 292 and
289 Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the
Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 318 (1995); see Coughlin, supra note 286, at 82 (describing
how Walker's analysis fails to account for key features of the Seligman study that discredit
her "crude comparison between the psychology of battered women and caged dogs");
Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted
Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REv. 107, 124 (2004)
("Research with women assaulted by their male partners has consistently demonstrated
that women employ a range of creative ways through which they attempt to escape, avoid,
minimize, or stop the violence against them.").
290 Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 1000 (1995).
291 See Raeder, supra note 286, at 797 ("[D]espite the problems of well-defined proof,
there is massive anecdotal evidence generally confirming [battered woman syndrome].").
292 See Tehan v. United States. 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that. although the "basic
purpose of a trial is the determination of truth," the "Fifth Amendment's privilege against

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

450

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:397

which errs on the side of protecting the innocent even if doing so
comes at the expense of punishing the guilty. 293 It sets us down a slippery slope toward the consequentialist manipulation of evidence rules
in other contexts, raising a number of troubling systemic questions. If
we are willing to manipulate evidentiary doctrine to give the prosecution an advantage in domestic violence cases, why stop there? Why
not extend this reasoning to other crimes that are difficult to prosecute, like organized crime offenses? This begs yet another question: If
we are going to manipulate evidentiary doctrine to facilitate conviction, what is the purpose of a trial?
Furthermore, the decoupling of evidence rules from their justificatory roots to reflect the prevailing stereotypes about domestic violence is unfair to defendants. It modifies the rules-in advance of a
trial at which an allegation of domestic violence will be adjudicatedto reflect the presumption that certain behavioral patterns on the part
of the defendant and complainant are highly suggestive of the defendant's guilt of the charged offense. Since this narrative presumes a
batterer, the rules are changed to depict the defendant as always and
already guilty, as someone whose bad past dictates his present
behavior and has impacted the complainant in a way that leaves her
unable to meaningfully participate in the prosecutorial process. As
such, these rules unfairly undermine the presumption of innocence
and compromise the reasonable doubt standard. 294
Some may respond that we are not heading down a slippery slope
toward the dismantling of a transsubstantive evidentiary code, nor
treating defendants unfairly, but rather carving out targeted and limited exceptions that simply rebalance the scales of justice for victims
of domestic violence. 295 Applying traditional evidence rules in these
cases, the argument goes, is unfair to complainants and society
because doing so allows batterers to escape punishment, leaving them
self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," but nonetheless
demands "undiluted respect").
293 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.").
294 For an extensive analysis of the fundamental fairness and constitutional implications
of vitiating the propensity ban for defendants accused of sex offenses and child molestation
after the passage of FED. R. Evm. 413-415, which applies equally to domestic violence
defendants, see Natali & Stigall, supra note 97, at 23-34, and also see Jeffrey G. Pickett,
The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and
the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 899-902
(1995) (arguing that Rules 413-415 undermine the presumption of innocence).
295 See sources cited supra notes 17-18.
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free to commit future acts of violence. 296 Implicit in this argument is
the normative presumption that criminalization is an ideal and effective response to every act of domestic violence. As the next section
demonstrates, this presumption is false.
B.

Instrumental Harms

The dominance feminist iteration of domestic violence exceptionalism was politically palatable because it provided a straightforward
explanation of this complex problem that led to an equally straightforward policy: a universal criminal justice response to reports of
domestic violence. The specialization of evidentiary doctrine that
occurs in domestic violence prosecutions is the latest step-following
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies-in this larger
project of advancing a strong, criminalization-focused response to
domestic violence.291
In the decades that have passed since the state began to take
domestic violence seriously, however, it has become increasingly clear
that this myopic focus on criminal justice responses to domestic violence is neither an effective nor sufficient solution for many complainants. It is undeniable that mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution
policies-the pillars of the criminalization model-have increased the
number of arrests for and prosecutions of domestic violence
offenses. 298 Yet data is, at best, "mixed" as to whether these strategies
have increased victim safety. 299 Many studies indicate that mandatory
arrest practices have an insignificant effect on victim safety, and some
suggest they actually escalate violence300 and can increase the likelihood of recidivism. 301 Similarly, the use of no-drop prosecution
See sources cited supra note 18.
See Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for
Policy and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479,
479 (2005) ("The bulk of recently adopted ... criminal justice reforms [targeting domestic
violence J have taken the form of relatively inflexible, one-size-fits-all mandatory responses
focused on counseling, restraining, and punishing batterers to prevent them from
reoffending.").
298 See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 217-18, 224-25 (2008)
(summarizing studies demonstrating large increases in domestic violence arrests and
decreases in the dismissal of domestic violence prosecutions).
299 See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 801, 815 {2001) (summarizing the finding of
a National Institute of Justice study of the deterrent effect of arrest as having "at best a
modest and short-lived deterrent effect"); Kohn, supra note 298, at 237-38 (summarizing
research on the effect of no-drop prosecution policies on victim safety and recidivism).
300 See Kohn, supra note 298, at 235-36 (summarizing studies).
301 Lawrence W. Sherman et al., 57 AM. Soc. REv. 680, 680 (1992), cited in Coker, supra
note 299, at 815 {2001).
296
297
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polices over the complainant's objection increases the risk of future
abuse in some cases. 302 Thus, while compulsory criminal justice intervention may increase the safety of some women, it is an ineffectiveand perhaps dangerous-response for others. 303
The criminalization model not only provides a universalized
response that does not work for some, but also problematically reinforces the dominance feminist conception of a universalized complainant: one who wants and is willing to invoke the criminal justice
apparatus to end her abusive relationship. 304 But, as anti-essentialist
feminist theorists have emphasized, "there is no unitary women's
experience." 305 The criminalization model overlooks the ways in
which factors such as race, class, sexual orientation, and citizenship
status impact a complainant's willingness to call on the criminal justice
system and participate in the state-mandated separation that so often
results from such intervention. For example, as Kimberle Crenshaw
has underscored, women of color "are often reluctant to call the
police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people
of color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a
police force that is frequently hostile." 306 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender individuals, whose communities have also been histori-

302 See Kohn, supra note 298, at 237-38 (summarizing studies). One explanation for this
phenomenon is offered by research that suggests "battered women who oppose arrest and
prosecution because they predict it will result in further violence are often accurate in their
assessment." Coker, supra note 299, at 818.
303 See RICHIE, supra note 14, at 3-4 (arguing that "there is evidence that some women
are safer in 2012 than they were 25 years ago" as a result of the criminalization of domestic
violence, but "women with less power"-particularly black women-are "in as much
danger as ever"); Kohn, supra note 298, at 235 ("Most [studies] suggest that, while some
victims may be at a decreased risk of re-abuse under a mandatory intervention regime, the
policies tend to have an insignificant effect on victim safety and may even put some victims
at increased risk."). Ironically, "the overall impact of mandatory arrest laws for domestic
violence have [sic] led to decreases in the number of battered women who kill their
partners in self-defense, but they have not led to a decrease in the number of batterers who
kill their partners." Critical Resistance & Incite! Women of Color Against Violence,
Gender Violence and the Prison-Industrial Complex, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 223, 223 (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence ed. 2006).
304 Beth E. Richie calls this the "everywoman analysis" and describes "everywoman" as
"a white, middle-class woman who can turn to a counselor, a doctor, a police officer, or a
lawyer to protect her from abuse." RICHIE, supra note 14, at 89-92.
305 GoODMARK, supra note 5, at 4. In the context of domestic violence law and policy,
"[a]nti-essentialist feminist theory prompts questions about why the law defines domestic
violence as it does and whose interests are protected (and whose ignored)" and "rejects the
notion that one set of solutions is appropriate for every woman subjected to abuse ... ."Id.
at 5.
306 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1257 (1991).
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cally oversurveilled, may similarly hesitate to invoke the state's police
power in response to domestic violence.301
Furthermore, the universalized complainant is one who wants to
and can sever all ties with her abusive partner. Yet, many remain
dependent on their abusive partners for many reasons, including
financial, familial, or emotional support; they may decide, for those
reasons, that pursuing prosecution is not in their best interests. While
prosecuting the batterer under such circumstances may lead to a criminal justice "success," such an approach overlooks how and why such a
result may represent a failure for the complainant. For example, it
does nothing to address the financial difficulties the complainant may
face if the defendant is incarcerated or the gaps in child care that may
result from his absence.3os
Although it is becoming increasingly clear that a compulsory
criminal justice response is not a "one size fits all" solution to the
complex social problem of domestic violence, state actors continue to
pursue this myopic criminalization agenda. The development of specialized evidence rules is part of the larger project of forcing allegations of abuse to "fit" into the criminal justice system. They enable
prosecutors to circumvent evidentiary gaps created by the complainant's absence, or undermine the testimony of complainants who
testify unfavorably to the prosecution. The domestic violence context
exception, for example, authorizes admission of evidence of prior acts
of abuse to undermine the credibility of a recanting complainant and
depict the relationship as eternally abusive. 309 The medical treatment
and diagnosis exception allows prosecutors to substitute a medical
provider's testimony recounting the complainant's allegations for the
complainant's in-court testimony. 310 And developments in the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception increasingly enable courts to find the

307 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 37 (2009)
(recounting reasons why lesbians may hesitate to "engage the criminal justice system" in
response to domestic violence).
308 Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (2000) ("[S]eparation may
create catastrophic results for poor women. Separation threatens women's tenuous hold on
economic viability, for without the batterer's income or his assistance with childcare, for
example, women may lose jobs, housing, and even their children.").
309 See supra Part Il.A.2 (recounting the consequences of the domestic violence context
exception).
3!0 See supra Part II.B (discussing the medical treatment and diagnosis exception in the
domestic violence context).
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defendant responsible for the complainant's refusal to testify, even
when she affirmatively refutes such a conclusion. 311
Thus, the manipulation of evidence rules to reflect the dominance
feminist iteration of domestic violence exceptionalism facilitates an
ineffective universalized response mechanism. The conclusion to be
drawn from this observation, however, is not that the criminal justice
system has no role to play in responding to domestic violence. That
police and prosecutors now take domestic violence seriously is an
accomplishment, not a cause for concern. The problem, rather, is that
the state presents the criminal justice system in "isolation from other
possible responses," as the sole response mechanism for addressing
domestic violence, instead of as "part of a menu of options for women
who are harmed by male violence. "312 Emerging research suggests
that "responding flexibly to victims' needs and providing them with
advocacy and broad social support could be a more successful strategy
for eliminating domestic violence" than criminal justice responses.3 13
Yet, as a result of this criminalization myopia, we have lost sight of
alternative, extracriminal responses that may be more desirable for
some complainants and more effective for some defendants. 314
C.

Rhetorical Harms

The evidentiary manipulation that occurs in domestic violence
prosecutions also causes a less functional, but equally troubling, harm:
It rhetorically reinscribes the disempowering image of the "true
victim" on those who resist state intervention. "True victims" are the
embodiment of learned helplessness;315 they are "entirely helpless"
and refuse to cooperate because they are "paralyzed by fear." 316
311 See supra Part Il.C (discussing the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in the
domestic violence context).
312 RICHIE, supra note 14, at 163.
313 Goodman & Epstein, supra note 297, at 480 (citation omitted); see id. at 484
(summarizing research).
314 See Goodmark, supra note 5, at 157 ("Reliance on the law has preempted creative
thinking about other ways to assist women subjected to abuse and diminished the
possibility of partnership with communities who are unwilling to increase state
intervention into their members' lives."). Scholars have proposed many alternative
responses. See, e.g., GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 178-94 (summarizing proposals for
responding to domestic violence "beyond the law," including forming community-based
truth commissions, establishing economic security for people subjected to abuse, and
working with men who abuse to change their behavior); RICHIE, supra note 14, at 163
(advocating for the involvement of non-law enforcement actors who may influence an
offender's behavior, such as faith leaders or family members).
315 Hanna, supra note 12, at 1883 ("Women who do not want to proceed are
characterized either as agents in the battering-allowing it to continue because of their
lack of cooperation with the state-or as true victims who have 'learned helplessness.'").
316 Randall, supra note 289, at 145.
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The specialized evidence rules are crafted to reflect only those
traits that comport with this stereotype of domestic violence complainants as "passive, dependent, weak, and afraid." 317 The expanded
medical hearsay and treatment exception, for example, reflects the
paternalistic rationale that adult domestic violence complainants, like
abused children, are unable to make independent, rational decisions
about how to prevent future harm. And jurisdictions that are willing
to infer that the defendant caused the complainant's unavailabilityover her objection-insist that the only reason a complainant would
become "unavailable" is because she is afraid of her abuser or has
succumbed completely to his coercive control. In this way, the complainant becomes an agent of the defendant, unable to form an
opinion independent of his influence. 318 Similarly, by allowing the jury
to consider past acts of abuse in assessing a recanting complainant's
credibility, courts signal that her recantation is not a result of independent and rational decision making, but rather the inescapable psychological byproduct of abuse. In these ways, specialized rules work as a
one-way ratchet that recirculates the universalized image of battered
women to enable admission of evidence that is consistent with conviction, and to silence that which is not.
/J.

/l,fjicacy llarrns

The manipulation of evidence rules imposes a final cost that
should give pause even to those who continue to support the criminalization model: It may impede the efficacy of the criminal justice intervention altogether. Procedural justice studies demonstrate that the
way in which defendants experience the criminal justice system is a
significant factor in predicting future behavior. The experience of
being treated fairly by an authority figure-even during a sanctioning
process-legitimates that authority and increases one's satisfaction
with the outcome of that process, even if the outcome is not
favorable. 319 Outcome satisfaction, in turn, correlates positively with
317 See GoonMARK, supra note 5, at 76 (discussing this stereotype in the context of
domestic violence trainings).
318 This practice thus invokes the specter of coverture, under which a woman was
assumed to be "one" with her husband. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 2122-23 (discussing
the nineteenth century doctrine of marital unity).
319 See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 165 (1990) (outlining the impact
of procedural fairness on outcome satisfaction); Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843,
1878-80 (2002) (summarizing procedural justice studies and concluding that "extensive
data, obtained in a wide variety of contexts" reveals a "strong link" between "one's
perceptions of fair treatment and one's attitude toward authority"). One study showed that
the extent to which felony defendants felt criminal justice system actors treated them fairly
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future compliance with authority. 32° For example, study of the impact
of arrest on recidivism in domestic violence cases revealed that defendants who felt the police treated them fairly during the arrest procedures demonstrated a "significantly lower" recidivism rate than those
arrested pursuant to processes perceived as unfair. 321 Procedural justice was so significant that those who were arrested, but felt that they
were treated fairly, recidivated at a rate that approximated those who
achieved the more "favorable" outcome of being warned and released
without arrest. 322
The application of specialized evidence rules undermines many of
the "building blocks of procedural justice," particularly neutrality,
process control, and consistency. 323 Specialized rules-based as they
are upon the presumptively cyclical nature of domestic violenceundermine the appearance of neutrality by conveying that the court
has presumed the defendant's guilt from his past behavior. This
impression that the court has prejudged guilt and will adapt the evidence rules to reflect that judgment suggests to defendants that their
version of events is insignificant, or that their input is irrelevant to the
process by which guilt is adjudicated. Accordingly, such evidentiary
manipulation undermines a defendant's sense of "process control," or
the impression that he has a "genuine opportunity to state his case
and that his needs are being treated as a matter of concem." 324
Finally, as discussed above, specialized domestic violence evidence
rules emanate from the presumption that domestic violence is sub"substantially influenced" their satisfaction with the outcome of their criminal proceedings.
Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAw & Soc'v REv. 483,
503 (1988).
320 See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw & Soc'v REv. 163, 169 (1997) ("[T]he use of
fair procedures facilitates the development of perceptions that authorities are both
legitimate and moral. Once the perception that legal authorities are legitimate has been
shaped, compliance with the law is enhanced, even when it conflicts with one's immediate
self-interest."). Procedural justice thus challenges a central tenet of deterrence theory,
namely that an individual's self-interest is the only factor considered in assessing outcome
satisfaction. Epstein, supra note 319, at 1874-75. Alternatively, some proponents of
procedural justice take an instrumentalist position, consistent with deterrence theory, that
procedural justice matters because fair procedures lead to fair outcomes, and fair outcomes
inspire compliance. Id. at 1875; Paternoster et al., supra at 165.
321 Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 163.
322 Id.
323 See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1876-77 (identifying the "building blocks of
procedural justice" as trust or "process control," neutrality, consistency, and dignity).
324 Id. at 1876. Commentators have referred to this factor as "representation" and
explain, "[w]hile disputing parties may not feel that they have the right to determine the
outcome, it is important to their sense of fairness that they be given the opportunity to
present their case to authorities and that their opinions be given consideration."
Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 167.
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stantively "different" from other crimes of violence and, in fact, many
courts specify this "difference" as the primary justification for their
permissive evidence rulings. 325 This explicit acknowledgement that
prosecutors can introduce evidence in domestic violence prosecutions
that would be inadmissible but for the identity of the parties conveys
to domestic violence defendants that the evidence against them is
assessed according to a different, and more permissive, standard than
that used against other defendants. In so doing, this evidentiary
manipulation can undermine the defendant's sense of consistency by
conveying that courts are not treating all defendants equally. 326
Domestic violence defendants may become aware of this evidentiary manipulation in many ways, including through explanations by
· the court or their attorneys about the basis for the rulings or through
their own independent knowledge of the legal system. Some undoubtedly will point out that defendants may not become aware of legal
rulings because defense attorneys and/or courts are too overburdened
to keep defendants apprised of legal rulings about the admissibility of
evidence. As a normative matter, courts and attorneys should be
encouraged to keep a defendant informed about all possibly dispositive developments in his case. As a practical matter, keeping a defendant in the dark may further reduce his sense of procedural justice.327

325 See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (noting that the court
has treated evidence of prior abusive acts in the context of an intimate relationship
"differently" than it does other types of abuse, and concluding that this "different
treatment is appropriate in the context of the accused and the alleged victim of domestic
abuse"); People v. Benston, 942 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (N.Y. 2010) (concluding that domestic
violence "differs materially, ... from other types of assault" and relying on this difference
to justify admitting doctor's statement diagnosing the complainant with "domestic
violence").
326 See TYLER, supra note 319, at 118-19 ("Consistency refers to similarity of treatment
and outcomes. Consistency toward people generally takes the form of equal treatment for
all affected parties."). For example, to illustrate the concept of consistency, Tyler uses the
example of a baseball game, in which an "umpire should define the same strike zone for all
players." Id. In the evidentiary context, consistency requires that the court applies the
same rules equally to every defendant. See Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 168 ("To
the extent that legal authorities provide equal and invariant treatment, citizens are more
likely to view their experiences in a positive light, perceive authorities as moral and
legitimate, and comply with rules.").
327 See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1892-95 (suggesting increasing both communication
with defense attorneys and explanation of the trial process from the judge as strategies for
increasing procedural justice in domestic violence prosecutions); Tom R. Tyler & Justin
Sevier. How do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth,
Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REv. 1095, 1116-17
(2014) (arguing that authorities communicate trustworthiness-and increase procedural
legitimacy-by "explaining what the procedures they are using are and why they are
making the decisions they do").
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This evidentiary specialization can also diminish the complainant's sense of procedural justice. Research indicates that a complainant who feels that government officials have listened to her story
and are responsive to ·her individual needs is more likely to feel that
· she has been treated fairly and more likely to cooperate with the prosecution than one who feels "forced into a mandatory model dismissive
of her input. " 328 The use of specialized evidence rules to pursue prosecution against the complainant's wishes conveys that the complainant's unique and informed perspective about the appropriate
response to this complicated event is irrelevant, and that the state
knows better than she about how to best prevent future violence. This
dismissal of her input and insight not only reduces the likelihood that
the she will cooperate with the prosecution, but also decreases the
likelihood that she will enlist the assistance of criminal justice authorities to address subsequent incidents of domestic violence. 329
Thus, procedural justice insights suggest that even if evidentiary
manipulation facilitates a "successful" outcome (i.e. conviction), the
use of unfair processes that are unresponsive both to the defendant
and complainant's input in order to achieve that result decreases the
likelihood that a defendant will abstain from future violence. In other
words, it is not just that the ends do not justify the means, but also that
the means may impede the desired end.
CONCLUSION

This Article does not contest that domestic violence is exceptional; it is undeniably exceptional in the depth and breadth of its
destruction, its diversity of causes and effects, and its proven resistance to a singular solution. And yet, the evidentiary manipulation
recounted above reflects a narrow and singular exceptionalismnamely, that which emerged from dominance feminist theory, was
reified by early psychological studies of battered women, and quickly
gained traction with those empowered to set domestic violence law
and policy. As argued above, extending into the adjudicatory realm
this restrictive vision of what differentiates domestic violence from
other crimes undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system
and is unfair not only to defendants, but also to complainants whose
experiences do not comport with the prevailing narrative.
328
329

Goodman & Epstein, supra note 297, at 482 (citation omitted).
See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1891-92 (summarizing study finding that when

prosecutors were unresponsive to domestic violence complainants, the complainants were
unlikely to report subsequent assaults).
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Crafting rules to reflect our presumptions about the character of
a particular crime and its perpetrators and victims-as opposed to our
judgments about what evidence is fair and reliable-sets us on the
slippery slope toward the selective dismantling of our outcomeneutral evidentiary code. The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, however, is not that the experience of prosecuting domestic violence cases has nothing to teach us about our evidence rules. The
unique evidentiary hurdles in domestic violence prosecutions may
indicate that our rules require revision. But any resultant changes to
evidentiary rules should reflect shifting conclusions about the principles behind the rules themselves, not presumptions about the character of a particular crime. Such an approach would be more honest,
fair, and, ultimately, less harmful than recirculating restrictive ideas
about what domestic violence is-or is not.
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